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THE HIGHWAYS AND SOME OF THE BYWAYS IN
THE SALES AND BULK SALES ARTICLES OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
William E. Hogant
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred and four, or no less than one-quarter, of the Uniform
Commercial Code sections are devoted to provisions governing the sale
of goods. Only eleven sections, however, are devoted to bulk sales.
Quantitatively article 2 is obviously the most significant in the7 Code.
What of the qualitative changes made by the article?
Generally several comments can be made. First, the Code rules are
drafted and formulated upon the premise that specific tests should be
devised for solving specific problems. Thus the so-called "lump-sum"
concept of title is no longer the test for a variety of different issues.'
This approach of delineating issues for separate treatment contributes
to the bulk of article 2, but it should also contribute to the more expe-
ditious resolution of questions governed by the article. Neither the
changes in language, nor the alterations in approach bring about revo-
lutionary changes in results. An emphasis here and in other Code commen-
" Win Ax E. HoGoA, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1949, LL.B. 1952, Boston
College. Legal Officer and Special Assistant to the Chief of Agency, Armed Forces Medical
Procurement Agency, 1952-55. Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School 1955-
58. Associate Professor of Law 1958. On leave as a Ford Foundation Fellow, Harvard Law
School 1957-58. Consultant Massachusetts, Special Legislative Commission on the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1957. Consultant on the Uniform Commercial Code to the New York
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1960-62, and to the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, 1961. Co-author of Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code in Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, and New York. Member of the American Law Institute and the
Massachusetts Bar.
1 Under the pre-Code law problems involving risk of loss, right to the purchase price,
tax liability, insurability, creditors' rights, rules of damages, choice of law and the availa-
bility of possessory remedies often turned on the question of property. Compare, Williston,
"The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561
(1950), with Corbin, "The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?",
59 Yale LJ. 821 (1950). One must take care in studying the voluminous literature com-
menting upon the Code, since the present version enacted in eighteen states dates from
1957 with some additional changes made in 1958. Unless otherwise indicated all references
to the Code here are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 Official Text with Comments
(hereinafter cited as UCC with the appropriate section number, e.g., UCC § 2-401).
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taries on novelty should not obscure the fact that there are relatively
few major changes in legal results under article 2 of the Code.
Second, the Code provisions are drafted in light of the fact that parties
to a typical sales transaction do not adjourn to a nearby lawyer's office
for a closing ritual. In fact, the kind of formality usual in the real estate
transaction would serve only to impede the movement of goods in com-
merce. The transactions here involved are fundamentally laymen's ar-
rangements made in volume in the market place.' Lawyers enter only
when catastrophe occurs. Recognition of this aspect of sales results in
the Code's making some transactions legally effective, even when con-
trary to some traditional concepts of contract formation and perform-
ance.
3
Third, the sales article recognizes that in many instances the legal
consequences of conduct by a skilled business professional should be
different from the consequences of the conduct by the casual buyer
unfamiliar with the trade. In several situations under the Code, results
differ when a merchant is involved, when the transaction is between
merchants, or when the goods are purchased by a consumer for his
personal, family or household use.4
When we turn to examine the bulk sales article of the Code, we find
the kind of transaction where lawyers usually join in the preparation of
the arrangements. The traditional formalities required of the parties
to a bulk transfer not in the ordinary course of business are retained
and clarified in a uniform statute.
Finally, each section of the entire Code is accompanied by the drafts-
men's comments. Unfortunately, in some states, including New York,
no general distribution of the Code with the official comments has yet
been made by the publishers of the statutory collections. The com-
ments are important not only to the specialist but also to the lawyer
who deals only occasionally with a sales problem. Helpful explanations,
insights into policy decisions, and the resolution of many issues which
might be debated under the text are found in these comments. 5
2 This point is ably developed by an experienced practitioner in Weeks, "The Illinois
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-Sales," 50 Ill. B. J. 494, 495 (1962).
3 Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales (Under the UCC) 2 (1958). Professor Hawkland's
monograph is a helpful introductory guide to the Code. It is available from the Director of
the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia 4,
Pennsylvania.
4 Merchant is defined in UCC § 2-104, and the definition of consumer goods in UCC
§ 9-109 is incorporated into article 2 by UCC § 2-103(3). On the merchant provisions,
see Note, 39 Geo. L.J. 130 (1950).
5 Braucher, "Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code," 58 Colum. L. Rev.
798, 808 (1958). The legitimacy of using the comments concerned the New York Law
Revision Commission, particularly when the conclusions seemed to go beyond the text
of the statute. Pasley, "Panel Discussion On the Uniform Commercial Code," 12 Bus. Law.
49, 57-58 (1956).
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Furthermore, by providing cross references and discussing the inter-
relationship of the sections the comments also afford substantial help to
the lawyer who comes to the Code for the first time.
This article is written for such a lawyer not only with the hope that
the Code will be made less formidable but also with the prayer that
enough red flags will be raised about some of the difficulties bound to
arise in any statute of such breadth covering the dynamic field of mer-
chandising. As a consequence, my treatment will be organized around
a number of commercially important questions involving various parts
of the Code's organization.
II. WHEN ARE GooDs "DFEcTVE" oR NONCONFORMING?
A. Express and Implied Warranties
1. The Creation of the Warranty
The attorney who is confronted with a telephone call from a television
set manufacturer complaining about the quality of a recent shipment of
cabinets has a basically different problem from the lawyer who receives
a visit from a woman who has lost her hair because she used a strong
hair dye. Nonetheless, lawyers strangely tend to classify these cases
together.
We might think first in both these situations of the law of warranty.
Did the seller make any misrepresentation of .fact or any promise
concerning the goods in question? How material was that statement?
Did the buyer rely upon the statement? Was the statement by the seller
merely sales talk, puffing, or a statement of value? These same questions
must be asked under the Code.6 In addition to the preservation of these
old problems, the Code makes two kinds of alterations in the law in rela-
tion to the creation of an express warranty. First, warranties by descrip-
tion and warranties by sample are reclassified as express warranties.7 At
first blush this may not seem to be a striking innovation; perhaps it is
not. The change avoids the confusion created by the prior classification
of description warranties as expressed in some cases and as implied in
others. Difficulties have arisen in interpreting contract provisions dis-
claiming implied warranties but not mentioning express warranties.8
6 UCC § 2-313 requires that the affirmation must "relate to the goods and become part
of the basis of the bargain"; and limits liability for statements of value by precluding a
warranty where the affirmation is "merely of value of the goods or a statement purporting
to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods ... ." The Uniform Sales Act,
more flatly stated that no "affirmation of value of the goods ...shall be construed as a
warranty." Uniform Sales Act § 12.
T Compare UCC § 2-313 and Uniform Sales Act §§ 12, 14, 16.
8 In the most frequently cited case illustrating the problem, the court concluded that
descriptive language listing a generator as "1-1420 KVA-1136 KW at 807" created an
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The second important change in the law of express warranty relates to
the timing of the representation. Statements made even after a contract
has been formed may result in warranty liability under the Code rule
abolishing the requirement of consideration for "agreements" modifying
a sales contractf Of course, some post-contractual claims by the seller
will not result in an "agreement," but the Code rule should avoid some
of the harsh aspects of the prior case law which failed to protect a buyer
who reasonably relied upon post-contractual assurances of the seller. 10
When we turn to the various implied warranties of quality, we have
more changes in detail and policy. The question of the implied warranty
of merchantability is dealt with in a single brief subsection of the Uni-
form Sales Act." In the Code this warranty rises to the dignity of a
separate section, covering probably five times as much of the statute
book as the earlier Uniform Sales Act provision.' 2 The major contri-
bution of this expansion will probably be the establishment in section
2-314(2) of statutory criteria for determining whether or not the war-
ranty of merchantability has been breached. These criteria are for the
most part based upon cases in the pre-Code law.'" Particularly worthy
of comment are the provisions which treat the effect of labels and pack-
ages. By making claims on a label or container, the seller undertakes that
these goods will conform to the claims. Even the retailer who sells goods
packaged by another apparently makes this kind of warranty under the
express warranty that the machine would develop 1136 KW of electricity which was not
negatived by a disclaimer clause covering implied warranties only. Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1951). The draftsman of the Uniform
Sales Act suggested that the description warranty should be classified as express but that
customi_ called such a warranty implied. 1 Williston, Sales § 223 (rev. ed. 1948). Prior to
the Sales Act, some cases held language of description to be a warranty. Bogert, "Express
Warrahties in Sales of Goods," 33 Yale L.J. 14, 21 (1923).
9 UCC § 2-209. Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(2).
10 New legal consideration was required by some courts for fixing warranty liability
upon a seller for statements made subsequent to the sale. If the buyer had no color right
to return the goods, then the seller's statements were not supported by sufficient considera-
tion. See Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal. App. 2d 517, 252 P.2d 637 (1st D. 1953). At least
one court concluded that a representation at any time prior to delivery of the goods was
effective to bind the seller. Webster' v. Hodgkins, 25 N.H. 128 (1852). In UCC § 2-313,
comment 7, consideration is said to be unnecessary in the case of subsequent assurances.
Furthermore, the Code's use of the language "part of the basis of the bargain" in substi-
tution of a reliance test may also be sufficient to eliminate any objection based on a lack
of reliance by the buyer upon the subsequent statement. Prior statements by the seller both
under the Code and the Sales Act may be made the basis of warranty liability if the affirma-
tions relate to the goods, i.e., cover a series of transactions. See 1 Williston, supra note 8,
§ 210; Note, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 197 (1950); UCC § 2-313, comment 5. Compare El
Zarape Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. Plant Food Corp., 90 Cal. App. 2d 336, 203 P.2d 13 (1949).
11 Uniform Sales Act § 15(2).
12 UCC § 2-314.
13 The Code standards are new in expression and change some results but some case
support exists for each subsection of UCC § 2-314(2): Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract- description; and(b) in the case bf fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
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Code. 14 In addition, the seller also warrants the quality of the container
itself.' 5 Furthermore, the language of the Sales Act, providing that the
warranty of merchantability only arises in a sale by description, has
been abandoned. For the most part the courts frequently ignored this
"description" test prior to the development of the Code.'" One other
question of rather ancient vintage is also settled. Under the merchanta-
bility provisions of the Code, the sale of food or drink to a consumer
either on or off the premises is a sale within the meaning of the section.' 7
This provision finally puts to rest the ancient distinction between "utter-
ing" and "selling" food, long abandoned by many American courts.'
The other major implied warranty of quality is usually known as the
"fitness" warranty. In section 2-315 the Code adopts the basic scheme
of the prior law. The most important change will probably be the aban-
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label
if any.
Collins, "Warranties of Sale Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 42 Iowa L. Rev.
63, 70 (1956); Ezer, "The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties," 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 281, 292-95 (1961). See Williston, Sales
§ 243 (rev. ed. 1948). The listing is not intended to be exhaustive. UCC § 2-314, com-
ment 6.
14 UCC § 2-314(2) (f) requires that the goods must "conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any." No distinction is made when
the immediate seller did not adopt or make the label claims himself.
15 UCC § 2-314(2)(g). This question was not settled in the pre-Code law. Compare
Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942) and Torpey v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (doubt expressed that retailer bound by
implied warranty as to jar containing fruit), with Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App. Div. 831,
292 N.Y. Supp. 586 (2d Dep't 1937) and Sanchez-Lopez v. Fedco Food Corp., 27 Misc.
2d 131, 211 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961) (both imposed warranty). With the ex-
ception of restaurant transactions the Code does not answer the question whether the
transaction is a "sale" to which warranties attach. In Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341
Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961), the court imposed an implied warranty on a milk bottle
in which a dairy sold milk even though there was no charge for the bottle and the customer
was obliged to return the bottle. See also Cooper v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 319 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1939).
16 Excellent analyses of the problem created by the description requirement may be
found in Honnold, Sales and Sales Financing 78-82 (2d ed. 1962) and Ruud, "The Vendor's
Responsibility For Quality in The Automated Retail Sale," 9 Kan. L. Rev. 139, 141-51
(1960).
17 UCC § 2-314(1). It is probably not significant that such transfers are made "sales"
only within the merchantability section, since most cases involving restaurant transactions
treat facts which give rise to the merchantability as well as the fitness warranty. Quaere
whether the courts will be willing to give a broad meaning to the word "serving" in this
section and open an avenue for imposing warranty obligations in the supermarket or
self-service cases. Compare Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d
305 (1946). UCC § 2-313, comment 2, states that the warranty sections of the Code are
not designed to disturb case development extending warranties to nonsales transactions.
See Farnsworth, "Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases," 57 Colum. L. Rev.
653 (1957). Furthermore, UCC § 1-102, comment 1, approves application of the policies of
the Code to transactions not included within the scope of the statute where reason and
policy require the use of such principles.
18 1 Williston, supra note 8, § 242b; Vold, Sales § 94 (2d ed. 1959).
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donment of the so-called "trade name" exception to the creation of the
warranty. Under the Uniform Sales Act it was determined as a matter
of law that when a trade name was employed by the buyer in a sale of a
specified article, no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose could
arise, since the buyer relied on the skill or judgment of the manufacturer
and not upon his immediate seller.19 The Code rejects this position. The
question of reliance is, however, still open under the Code, and the use
of a trade name will still be material in deciding that factual question.20
A less significant change is made in the rules governing the warranty
of fitness. Under the Sales Act the buyer was required to "make known"
his purpose to the seller, 21 while under the Code the seller is only re-
quired to have reason to know the buyer's purpose.2" Although this
change is not consistent with the language of the Uniform Sales Act, it is
in accord, as are other alterations, with many court decisions.2"
2. Limitations Upon Warranty Liability
In the pre-Code law the courts developed several important limitations
upon warranty liability. Perhaps the most significant of these restrictions
was the recognition of the contractual disclaimer under which the seller
sought to escape some or all of his warranty obligations. 24 The Code
makes a substantial alteration in the prior law. After starting with an
19 Uniform Sales Act § 15(4). 1 Williston, supra note 8, § 2362. The presence of a trade
name is not necessarily decisive if other facts show the reliance by the buyer. Pabellon v.
Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 34, U.S. 893 (1951); Green Mountain
Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953); Foley v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y. Supp. 233 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1930), aff'd, 232 App.
Div. 822, 249 N.Y. Supp. 924 (2d Dep't 1931).
2o UCC § 2-315, comment 5.
21 Uniform Sales Act § 15(1).
22 UCC § 2-315. Both UCC §§ 2-314 and 2-315 also omit the language in Uniform Sales
Act § 15 that the merchantability and fitness warranties attach whether the seller be "the
grower or manufacturer or not." UCC § 2-315, comment 4, states that the draftsmen
did not intend to revive the older test that the seller must be a grower or manufacturer.
23 Compare Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918) (meat obviously
for food), with Standard Rice Co. v. P. R. Warren Co., 262 Mass. 261, 159 N.E. 508
(1927) (box buyer required to show that seller was informed of plan to use automatic
filling machines).
24 Uniform Sales Act § 71 permitted a right, duty or liability arising by implication of
law to be negatived or varied by express agreement. Although one might argue that at
least express warranties do not arise "by implication of law" the courts permitted dis-
claimer. The high point may have been reached in Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d
685 (3d Cir. 1953), where a disclaimer clause covering all obligations or liabilities precluded
negligence liability. While disclaimers in pre-Code law could in theory give the seller com-
plete protection, the courts were frequently willing to give such clauses a narrow construc-
tion. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) (implied warranties not ex-
cluded by clause precluding warranties not written in contract); S. F. Bowser & Co. v.
McCormack, 230 App. Div. 303, 243 N.Y. Supp. 442 (4th Dep't 1930). See note, 1939
Wis. L. Rev. 459. Later years have seen the development of a policy against some standard
disclaimers. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 607 (1961) (quality disclaimer in standard automobile contract).
See Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 154, 209 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 1960) (disclaimer of title warranty contrary to public policy).
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absolute prohibition upon disclaimers of the express warranties in the
earlier drafts, the Code draftsmen moved to a rule providing that the
disclaimer is inoperative if not consistent with any express warranty.25
A court is first called upon to construe the two provisions as consistent
with each other wherever such a construction is reasonable. Where the
construction is not reasonable, then the disclaimer will apparently be
inoperative.2  The phrasing of the rule does not make for precision in
predicting results; but it seems that one wishing to rid himself of lia-
bility for express warranty must structure his agreement to avoid the
creation of any express warranty, e.g., by placing an explicit disclaimer
immediately following the language of description. Otherwise, the war-
ranty will control.
In most cases even more must be done by a seller who wishes to rid
himself of the liability for the breach of the merchantability and fitness
warranties. To avoid both implied warranties, the disclaimer must be
written, conspicuous, and expressed in somewhat specific language.
Less is required if only one of the implied warranties is to be disclaimed.
The exclusion of a fitness warranty must be in writing and must also be
conspicuous. 28 The merchantability warranty, on the other hand, may in
the absence of a writing be orally disclaimed as long as merchantability
is mentioned. If a writing is involved, the merchantability warranty
must be mentioned, and the disclaimer must again be conspicuous. These
rather technical limitations are then modified to a considerable degree
by subparagraph (3) of section 2-316. All implied warranties are ex-
cluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion and makes plain that there are no implied warranties.2 0 This kind
2 UCC § 2-316(1) in the earlier drafts provided "If the agreement contains an express
warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Com-
ments Ed. § 2-316 (Official Draft 1952). Apparently the draftsmen became convinced that
this approach went too far particularly in sales between large merchants in protecting
the buyer against improvidence. Braucher, "Article 2-Sales," Uniform Commercial Code
in Massachusetts 99, 116 (1958). The change has not been popular with at least one com-
mentator. Ezer, "The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales Warranties," 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 281, 310 (1961). Compare Weeks, supra note 2,
at 513-14. Note that the parol evidence rule, UCC § 2-202, disucssed infra at note 35,
and the unconscionable contract section of the Code, discussed infra at note 218, also may
affect disclaimers.
26 In Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947), the
court interpreted written language as not creating an express warranty and at least onejudge was moved to that conclusion by the presence of a disclaimer clause. Id. at n.12.
27 UCC § 2-316(2).
28 "Conspicuous" is defined in UCC § 1-201(10).
29 The draftsmen took pains to state that the rules in subsection (2) operate 'subject to
subsection (3)" and that subsection (3) provisions are operative "notwithstanding subsec-
tion (2)." Consequently, it seems that the "as is" language need not be conspicuous. Com-
pare Honnold, supra note 16, at 112. The warranty of title imposed by UCC § 2-312 is
probably not affected by UCC § 2-316, since the warranty is not classified as express or
1962]
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of language apparently may be oral in the case of either the fitness or the
merchantability warranty. As a counseling matter, the seller may avoid
difficult factual disputes if he drafts his agreement to meet the con-
spicuous and written requirements of subsection (2).3 0
The effect of a disclaimer by a manufacturer upon subsequent sales
at wholesale and retail is an open question under the Code and under
the pre-Code law.3 Nothing in the Code plainly indicates that such a
disclaimer is operative in subsequent sales. However, the standards for
merchantability do make the retailer responsible for claims made on a
label by the maker. 32 Consequently, it may be argued that if the label
limits liability of the retailer because of language placed thereon by the
manufacturer, then the retailer, should be able to take advantage of that
limitation. A final type of contractual disclaimer limits the remedies of
the buyer for a breach of warranty. Section 2-719 validates provisions
for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in the
Code. Furthermore, the section specifically authorizes a contractual
term restricting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repay-
ment of the price, or to repair and replacement of the goods.33
Another major means of avoiding warranty liability under pre-Code
law is the parol evidence rule, which has been used to eliminate both
express and implied warranty obligations.34 Antecedent express warran-
ties may still be excluded by the operation of the parol evidence rule,
since section 2-316(1) specifically incorporates the parol evidence rule
of the Code, section 2-202. Thus where a particular document is pro-
tected by the Code parol evidence rule, the buyer will not be able to
introduce evidence of earlier conflicting affirmations of fact relating to
the goods.3 An entirely different matter arises when we deal with the
implied and subsection (2) of UCC § 2-312 provides a special disclaimer rule. Compare
Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 154, 209 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1960). Note that the title warranty expressly covers infringement claims.
30 Another means of avoiding implied warranties of merchantability may arise from the
rules for ascertaining intention in UCC § 2-317, where express warranties displace incon-
sistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Note that this is merely a rule for ascertaining intent and that the courts are first asked to
interpret warranties as consistent with each other and as cumulative. UCC § 2-317, com-
ment 1.
31 See Marino v. Maytag Atlantic Co., 141 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. City Court 1955) (adop-
tion by remote seller required).
2 UCC § 2-314(1) (f).
33 The different treatment will necessitate a determination in many cases of whether a
particular clause falls into the disclaimer or modification of remedy categories. If the clause
is in the latter group, UCC § 2-719 contains limitations on the clause: (1) to be the ex-
clusive remedy the agreement must expressly so provide, (2) if the exclusive remedy stipu-
lated fails "of its essential purpose," remedy may be had under the Code, and (3) limita-
tion of damages for personal injuries in cases involving consumer goods is made prima
facie unconscionable.
34 See the discussion in Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 858 (1953).
35 The Code parol evidence provisions in UCC § 2-202 wil not prevent proof of con-
sistent additional oral express warranties unless the writing is a complete and exclusive
[Vol. 48
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SYMPOSIUM
warranties of merchantability and fitness. No reference to the parol evi-
dence rule is made in the disclaimer section of the Code dealing with
these warranties. In fact, exclusion depends upon the use of rather ex-
press language. This limitation will have the effect of preventing the
parol evidence rule from operating as a kind of secret disclaimer of
implied warranties. 6
One of the most heavily litigated issues in the current law of sales,
apart from the Code, is the question of privity.37 Here the rules of law
have been changing, not through the subtle process of erosion but rather
by an obvious process of explosion. The original requirement limited law
suits based upon any sales warranty to those between the original seller
and the original buyer.3 This "privity rule" has been lost in a series of
cases stating exceptions, limitations, and a consumer-oriented view of
the question. 9 The Code provision, startling a decade ago, now seems
to be rather modest.40 Under section 2-318 the seller's warranty covers
personal injuries of any plaintiff who is in the family or the household
of the buyer, or is a guest in his home, when it is reasonable to expect
that such a person will come in contact with the goods.
The Code statement of the rule does not enlarge the class of defendants
liable for breach of warranty. The question of whether a manufacturer
or wholesaler is liable to a retail buyer is deliberately left unanswered
by the Code. The comments make clear that the draftsmen did not intend
statement of the terms of the agreement, or unless the writing explicitly negates any warranty
and the writing is found to be a final statement of the terms as agreed upon.
36 In Dekofski v. Leite, 336 Mass. 127, 142 N.E.2d 782 (1957), the court precluded
parol evidence of the implied fitness warranty when the contract states that there were
no understandings, warranties, or agreements not included in the written order; and in
S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Independent Dye House, Inc., 276 Mass. 289, 177 N.E. 268 (1931),
implied warranties were excluded by an integrated contract stating that it covered "all
agreements between the parties relevant to this transaction." See also Valley Refrigeration
Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W.2d 294 (1943).
37 A recent collection of cases extends over 64 pages. Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
38 See Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928) (ex-
press warranties); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) (implied
warranties). The lower courts constantly sought to change or avoid the requirement. Note,
44 Cornell L.Q. 608 (1959).
S9 Prosser, "The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)," 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960). In New York in recent months the time-honored privity doctrine of
Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) has been abandoned (1) in the
food cases by extending the warranty protection to all members of the buyer's household,
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961), Note, 44
Cornell L.Q. 608 (1959), and (2) at least in cases of express claims by the manufacturer
by permitting a suit by a remote business buyer against the manufacturer. Randy Knitwear
v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
40 Originally the Code draftsmen proposed to abolish privity entirely in actions for
breach of warranty to all so related to the buyer as to make it reasonable to expect that
they would use, consume, or be affected by the goods. 1A U.L.A. § 42, Unif. Rev.
Sales Act, § 42 (1948). See comment, 57 Yale LJ. 1389, 1404 (1948). This was said to be
"too extreme in form" and "in conflict with important judicial authority in many states."
Dierson, "Report on the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 6 Food Drug Cosm. LJ.
943, 946 (1951).
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to limit the liability to the immediate seller alone; but no provision is
made for several classes of third parties who might fall into the plaintiff
group."' Thus the employee outside of the home, the hospital patient,
the wife who eats (fbod purchased by)her husband at a drive-in, are not
plainly protected by the privity rule of the Code. This does not mean,
however, that such plaintiffs will not be able to recover either under a
theory of negligence, of misrepresentation, or under the developing cases
stating a "warranty" liability which is close to nonfault tort liability. 2
One might say in summary that the Code rule qualifies a minimum
group of plaintiffs for suits against the original seller of the goods. The
maximum group of plaintiffs who will be eligible to bring such suits and
the maximum group of defendants liable for quality defects will continue
to be set by the pre-Code law and by the developing case materials in
the field.
B. Risk of Loss
A buyer who originally complained about the quality of a carload of
television cabinets might discover that he has no cause of action at all
even though the cabinets are entirely useless. The seller may success-
fully contend that the defect in the goods arose entirely after the risk of
loss had passed to the buyer. For the most part the Uniform Sales Act
placed the risk of loss upon the person who held the property in the
goods."3 In this area the Code changes our techniques more than the
actual results. Rather specific rules are established for determining the
answers to the risk-of-loss question. The Code tests are drafted to pro-
vide the lawyer with answers by reference to fact determinations, rather
than by a reference to the abstract concept of "property in the goods."
Where neither party has breached the contract, the lawyer's first task
under the Code rules covering risk is to determine whether the contract
requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier."4 This
question may be answered by referring to the agreement itself and then
to the specific definitions of trade terms set forth in sections 2-319
through 2-325.45 If under the contract the seller ships by carrier but has
41 See UCC § 2-313, comment 2, and UCC § 2-318, comment 3. Compare Thompson v.
Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (guest in car not within UCC § 2-318, but
privity not necessary apart from Code).
42 Compare the successive drafts of Restatement (Second), Torts § 402(a), first imposing
strict liability without regard to privity upon the seller of food and then extending that
liability to sellers of any product "for intimate bodily use" with a caveat that the In-
stitute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule may apply to other products.
43 Uniform Sales Act § 22. Of course, locating property in the goods was not always
the decisive issue. When a security title was reserved or when one party was in default, the
property test was not used. Uniform Sales Act § 22 and Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 27.
44 UCC § 2-509.
43 The Code sets forth definitions for a variety of trade contract terms, such as F.O.B.
and F.A.S. (§ 2-319); C.I.F. and C. & F. (§ 2-320); "Ex Ship" (§ 2-322). Questions of
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no duty to deliver the goods at a particular destination, the risk passes
to the buyer when the goods are delivered to the carrier. 6 On the other
hand, if the contract requires the seller to deliver the goods at a particu-
lar destination and the goods are there duly tendered, while in the pos-
session of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer at the time of
tender.47 For example, if the contract provides for delivery F.O.B. cars
at the seller's place of business, the goods will remain at the seller's risk
until the goods are loaded on board the carrier.48 If, on the other hand,
the contract calls for shipment F.O.B. the place of destination, the risk
of loss will remain on the seller until the goods reach the place of business
of the buyer and are tendered to him.49
The second major Code rule on risk of loss controls the allocation of
risk when a third party has control of the goods. Section 2-509 provides
that the risk of loss will pass to the buyer on acknowledgment by the
bailee of the buyer's right to possession. Once again title is irrelevant.50
The final major provision relating to risk of loss governs those cases
which involve neither shipment by a carrier nor goods in the hands of a
bailee. Under this catch-all rule the risk of loss will pass to the buyer at
different times, depending upon whether or not the seller is a "mer-
chant."'51 On the assumption that a merchant-seller will continue to insure
goods in his possession even though they are subject to a contract with
the buyer, the Code preserves the merchant's risk of loss until such time
as the buyer actually receives the goods.5" The nonmerchant-seller loses
the risk of loss upon tender of delivery to the buyer. Since most cases
will involve merchant-sellers, risk will generally fall upon the possessor
risk can be minimized by use of the appropriate F.O.B. term, since the Code rejects classifi-
cation of such terms as "price terms" unless there is agreement to the contrary. UCC § 2-319,
comment 1.
46 UCC § 2-509(1)(a). This approach should result in allocation of risk on much the
same basis as under the presumptions of Uniform Sales Act § 19, rule 4(1) read with § 22,
since property passed on appropriation by delivery to the carrier. Badhwar v. Colorado
Fuel & Iron Corp., 138 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 245 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1957).
47 UCC § 2-509(1)(b). This should make for results similar to those reached under rule
5 of Uniform Sales Act § 19.
48 UCC § 2-319(1)(c) states that the duty of loading goods on board is placed upon the
seller by use of the term F.O.B. vessel, car, or other vehicle. It is perhaps wise for the law-
yer to clearly use the appropriate term here and to advise his clients of this rule. Other-
wise, he will be forced to resort to trade usage to show that the seller had the duty to load
on board.
49 Under UCC § 2-320 the term C. & F. (cost and freight) has the same effect as a
C.I.F. (cost, insurance and freight) term except that in the latter the seller must obtain
insurance. See 2 Willston, supra note 8, § 280-C.
50 Only in those cases involving a negotiable document of title can one still argue that
"title" is relevant. In these instances UCC § 2-509(2) (a) passes the risk to the buyer upon
receipt of the document.
51 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
52 UCC § 2-103 defines "receipt" of goods as taking physical possession of the goods.
UCC § 2-509, comment 3, reveals the insurance basis of the risk allocation.
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of the goods rather than upon the person who has the property interest.53
The impact of insurance becomes even more apparent in the Code rule
fixing risk of loss when there has been a breach by one of the parties.
Basically the aggrieved patty who is in control of the goods may treat
the risk of loss as being upon the other party to the extent of any defi-
ciency in his insurance coverage." The comments indicate that deficiency
here means such deficiency in coverage as exists without subrogation.5
C. Cure
Lawyers are accustomed to view a transaction, at least in the beginning
of their analysis, as a framework for a search for the person who com-
mitted the first breach. The Code will considerably alter this analysis.
First, a seller who has delivered nonconforming goods which have been
rejected by the buyer may notify the buyer of his intention to "cure"
and then make a conforming delivery within the contract time.*6 The
comments expand the effectiveness of this provision by indicating that
the seller may have a second chance even when he has taken back the
nonconforming goods and refunded the purchase price. 7 Such a case
might also be handled as a mutual resolution of the dispute ending the
seller's responsibility in the matter.58 One other difficulty for the seller
arises from the fact that he must promptly notify the buyer of his inten-
tion to cure. The requirement of seasonable notificaton must be read in
light of the fact that after making a rejection the buyer may be faced
with the commercial necessity of looking elsewhere for his supplies.
In subsection 2 of section 2-508, the seller's power to cure is further
extended. This subsection is designed to protect the seller against what
the comment calls a surprise rejection.5 9 Thus the seller may have a
53 One caveat should be noted here. In a sale on approval, risk rests on the seller until
the buyer accepts the goods. See UCC § 2-327.
54 UCC § 2-510. Note also that under UCC § 2-501 the buyer obtains an insurable inter-
est upon identification and the seller retains such an interest so long as he has title or a
"security interest." UCC § 2-510(3) permits the seller to treat the risk as falling upon a
defaulting buyer to the extent of any insurance deficiency "for a commercially reasonable
time." An earlier version of the Code was criticized for not limiting the time during which
the buyer has the risk. Williston, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 583 (1950). During that time period the seller should either
dispose of the goods or revise his insurance program.
55 UCC § 2-510, comment 3.
56 UCC § 2-508(1). Compare Lowinson v. Newman, 201 App. Div. 266, 194 N.Y. Supp.
253 (1st Dep't 1922).
57 UCC § 2-508, comment 1.
58 Although UCC § 2-711 abandons any election doctrine whereby the buyer could be
deprived of any remedy when the goods are returned and the price repaid, if the parties
wish to end all obligations in this situation, nothing in the Code rejects guch a result. The
terms "termination" and "cancellation" have been deliberately avoided here, since they
are given a special meaning in the statute. See UCC § 2-106.
59 UCC § 2-508, comment 2. "Seasonably" is defined in UCC § 1-204 as at the agreed
time or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
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reasonable time even after the contract period to substitute conforming
goods: (1) where there is a latent defect in the goods, or (2) where
the defect is patent but of such a minor nature as to indicate that the
goods would be acceptable with a price adjustment.6 0 The section rejects
the time-honored, and perhaps time-worn notion, that the proper way
to assure effective results in commercial transactions is to require strict
performance. 6 Under the Code a buyer who insists upon such strict
performance must rely on a special term in his agreement or the fact
that the seller knows as a commercial matter that strict performance is
required. The documentary sale in an overseas transaction is an obvious
example of the latter kind of case.02
III. WH3[AT MAY THE DISAPPOINTED BUYER Do WHEN THE GOODS ARE
NONCONFORMING?
A. Self-help
1. Rejection in Whole or in Part: UCC 2-601
Apart from the special rule governing installment contracts,63 the Code
permits the buyer who receives nonconforming goods to reject those
goods no matter how slightly they differ from the contract requirements.
Of course, this power is reduced by the seller's power to cure under sec-
tion 2-508.14 Furthermore, as was the case under the prior law, the
buyer is required to act promptly and to notify the seller of his rejection. 5
The passage of property in the goods is again made irrelevant under the
Code rule.
Under the pre-Code law a seller who shipped goods to a buyer in a
distant city was faced with a major problem. If the buyer rejected the
goods properly, he had no further obligations in connection with the
goods. This meant that the seller who had no representative in the
buyer's city was faced with hiring a special agent to take care of
60 UCC § 2-508(2).
61 For an interesting discussion of the use of "cure" in defective title cases, see Hawk-
land, "Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial
Code," 46 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 722-23 (1962).
62 UCC § 2-508, comment 2, lists several illustrations where the seller must strictly per-
form, e.g., conformity of documents in overseas shipments, or the sale of precision parts
or chemicals for use in manufacture. Other amplifications in that comment state that the
seller is to be held to rigid compliance if the buyer gives notice either explicitly or by a
course of dealing involving rigorous inspection. The comment, nonetheless, suggests that a
"no replacement" clause in a "form" contract, giving express notice that strict performance
will be required, will not prevent the seller from showing that the clause is not consistent
with trade usage or the prior dealings of the parties, and was not called to his attention.
63 UCC § 2-612(2) limits rejection of an installment to situations where the "non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment." See also UCC § 2-504
where rejection is permitted only when "material delay or loss ensues" from the seller's
failure to make an appropriate shipping contract or to give buyer notice.
64 Honnold, "Buyer's Right of Rejection," 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457 (1949).
65 UCC §§ 2-601, 2-602; Uniform Sales Act §§ 49, 50.
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the goods. The Code changes this rule and requires a merchant buyer
who rejects goods to take certain steps to preserve and protect the
seller's interest. When the seller has no agent or place of business at
the market of rejection, the merchant buyer must follow the seller's
reasonable instructions with respect to the goods.66 To protect the buyer
in this situation, the Code also provides that the buyer may demand
indemnity for his expenses and that a failure to supply such an indemnity
makes the seller's instructions unreasonable.6 7 Even in the absence of
any instructions the merchant buyer must make a reasonable effort to
sell the goods for the seller's account if the goods are perishable or
threaten to decline in value speedily.68 In any event the buyer is en-
titled to reimbursement for his reasonable expenses in caring for and
selling the goods. Furthermore, the buyer is also assured a sales com-
mission. Good faith action by the buyer under these provisions or in
cases where the resale is optional protects him from liability for accept-
ance, for conversion, and for other damages. 9
2. Revocation of Acceptance
Protecting the buyer from unintended acceptance when he carries out
the instructions of the seller is important, particularly in light of the
Code rules on revocation of acceptance.70 The tests of when acceptance
occurs under the Code are roughly the same as under the Uniform Sales
Act.71 The new statute does introduce a major change in testing when
the buyer may revoke his acceptance, or in the language of the old order,
"rescind." The Code requires that the nonconformity must substantially
impair the value of the goods to the buyer, while the Uniform Sales Act
permitted rescission for any breach of warranty. 72  Under the Code,
revocation of acceptance is extended to cases where the buyer knew of
66 UCC § 2-603. Under the prior law the rejecting buyer had a duty to notify. the
seller, but he had no obligation to return the goods. Uniform Sales Act § 50. See 3
Williston, Sales § 497 (rev. ed. 1948). Compare the duty to return or offer to return
when the buyer rescinds under Uniform Sales Act § 69(3). "Market" here probably is
only a geological term meaning the area or region where rejection occurred. Note, 105
U. Pa. L. Rev. 837, 872-73 (1957).
67 UCC § 2-603(1). Section 2-711(3) gives a rejecting buyer a security interest in the
goods for payments made on the price and for any expenses reasonably incurred in
inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody.
68 UCC § 2-603(1). The general Code approach here is not unlike that contained in
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 Stat. 532, 7 U.S.C. § 499(b)(3), which
forbids the dumping, discarding or destruction by a merchant without reasonable cause
of covered goods.
69 UCC §§ 2-603(2), 2-604.
70 UCC § 2-608.
71 Under both UCC § 2-606(1) and Uniform Sales Act § 48 acceptance occurs if
after time for inspection the buyer signifies his acceptance, fails to effectively reject, or
does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership.
72 UCC § 2-608(1), Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(d)
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the breach but had assurances that it would be cured. As was true under
the prior law's rule for rescission, the buyer may not revoke when lack
of knowledg6 of the defect is not excused. The buyer who seeks to
exercise this form of self-help must act promptly, and he must notify
the seller of the revocation of acceptance. 71
3. Adequate Assurance of Performance
The buyer's action both after a rejection and after revocation of
acceptance may bring into play the seller's power to cure. To avoid un-
fair results to the buyer in this situation, the Code provides in section
2-609 that the buyer has the right to demand in writing an adequate
assurance of due performance. 74  The seller who fails to supply such
assurance promptly may find that the buyer is excused from further
performance. Moreover, a continued failure to provide such assurances
may result in a breach of contract by the party from whom the assur-
ances are demanded. In fact, a failure of thirty days' duration will auto-
matically result in a repudiation of the contract.75 This is a very risky
business for the party who is asked to supply the assurances. For exam-
ple, if the buyer receives defective goods, the seller may claim that the
goods conform to the contract or that the seller has a right to cure. If
the buyer demands assurances of due performance within a reasonable
time, the period within which the seller must act to supply such assur-
ances or be held liable for a breach of contract begins to run. The buyer
may have reasonable grounds for insecurity as to the quality of the goods
even in cases where the goods are actually not defective. In such a case
the seller's only breach will be his failure to provide timely assurance.
B. Legal Remedies of the Buyer
In addition to the actions which he may take without judicial assist-
ance, the buyer also has various bases for recovering damages under the
Code. First, the repayment of the price does not automatically preclude
recovery of damages by the buyer thereafter.76 This puts to rest the
73 UCC § 2-608(2). The cited section also precludes revocation after any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. Apparently
this preserves the principle developed under Uniform Sales Act § 69 for "rescission."
74 UCC § 2-609 defines "reasonable grounds for insecurity" and "adequate assurance
of due performance" only in a general way. In transactions between merchants both
are tested according to "commercial standards" (subsection (2)), and past acceptance of
an improper delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party's right to assur-
ance for future performance (subsection (3)). The extensive comment may be helpful.
75 UCC § 2-609(4). The use of the term "repudiation" is important, since comment 5
indicates that the repudiation can be retracted "under the section dealing with that prob-
lem." Only UCC § 2-611 seems relevant and that treats of anticipatory repudiation.
Quaere whether after thirty days has expired under UCC § 2-609(4) one can say that
the repudiation is anticipatory.
76 U3CC § 2-711.
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doctrine of election of remedies in the law of sales in much the same
fashion as did the special amendment to N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, section
150(1) (d) in New York."
The Code rule abolishing election of remedies is set forth in section
2-711. This section also sets forth, in one place, an index of the buyer's
various remedies upon breach by the seller. One of the most important
of the buyer's remedies is contained in the section dealing with "cover,"
which gives the buyer the option of fixing his money recovery by making
a new purchase in substitution of the goods due from the seller."' Once
again comment 2 to section 2-712 seems to spell out the meaning of this
definition of cover. The comment states that a replacement contract on
credit or delivery terms differing from the contract in breach may qualify
as a reasonable purchase. Furthermore, it is indicated in the same com-
ment that a series of contracts for sales as well as a single contract may
be made the basis for cover. By use of the "cover" concept, the Code
permits the buyer to make a substitute contract and thus fix in advance
of litigation the amount which he may recover as the difference between
the contract price and the market value as determined by the second
purchase price.79 The disappointed buyer may thus insulate himself
from the burden of showing that the market value which he selected
adequately represented the true market.
Under the pre-Code law the buyer may avoid this kind of dispute by
employing a liquidated damages provision. The Code in section 2-718
states some general rules as to the validity of such provisions. First, a
term in an agreement fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
void as a penalty. In testing the reasonableness of such a provision, the
Code calls upon the court to assay whether or not the amount is reason-
able in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulty of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. 0 Apparently, this test permits
the parties to claim that the clause is reasonable in light of their prospec-
tive judgment of the facts or in light of the harm in fact suffered by the
buyer. No mention is made in the section of 'a clause in an agreement
which may unreasonably underliquidate the damages. Comment No. 1
to section 2-718 once again illustrates the extent to which the draftsmen's
comments may supplement the provisions of the statute. The comment
77 Braucher, "The Commission and the Law of Contracts," 40 Cornell L.Q. 696, 713
(1955); Patterson, "Improvements in the Law of Restitution," 40 Cornell L.Q. 667,
670 n.10 (1955).
78 The buyer must act without unreasonable delay and in good faith. UCC § 2-712(1).
79 UCC § 2-712(2).
80 UCC § 2-718(1). See Macneil, 'Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies," 47 Cornell
L.Q. 495, 505 n.31 (1962).
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states that an unreasonably small amount would be subject to the same
criticism as an unreasonably large amount and might be stricken under
the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses.8 '
The liability of a seller for consequential damages is covered by section
2-715. The Code does not require that the seller consciously accept the
liability of an insurer for any particular harm. All that must be shown
is that the loss could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise
and resulted from the buyer's general or particular requirements and
needs which the seller should have anticipated at the time of the con-
tracting.82 In addition, injury to person or property proximately result-
ing from any breach of warranty is also compensable. 3 The latter rule
will effect little change in the existing law.
If the buyer will not or cannot cover, he will be required to prove the
market value of the goods in his attempt to recover any anticipated bene-
fits from his bargain.84 If the buyer has accepted the goods, the measure
of damages in the case of a breach of warranty is the difference at the
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted.85
This goes a bit beyond the prior law which generally used the time and
place of the passage of property in setting the time and place for deter-
mining the loss.86
The Code rule is apparently based upon the premise that the measure
of recovery should be related to the buyer's ability to procure compar-
able goods at his business location.87 A similar policy underlies the rule
for determining market price in cases of rejection after arrival or revo-
cation of acceptance. Here again the Code utilizes the market at the place
where the buyer received the goods or in the language of section 2-713
the market is fixed at the place of arrival. 'I his rule is probably intended
to parallel section 2-714 where the market is fixed as of the place for
accepted goods.88 In the remaining cases of nondelivery or repudiation
81 See Fritz, " 'Underliquidated' Damages as Limitation of Liability," 33 Texas L. Rev.
196 (1954).
82 UCC § 2-715(2) (a).
83 UCC § 2-715(2) (b). Comment 5 to the cited section explains that in cases where
injury occurs after use of the goods without discovery of the defect, the statutory term
"proximate" precludes recovery if the buyer unreasonably failed to discover the defect
or used the goods when the defect was known.
84 "Cover" is not mandatory, but failure to cover may cut down the buyer's ability
to recover consequential damages. UCC § 2-715(2)(a).
85 UCC § 2-714.
88 Uniform Sales Art § 69(7) states the test in terms of value at the time of delivery
to the buyer.
87 UCC § 2-713, comment 1.
88 Usually the "place of arrival" or the "place of acceptance" will be the same, but in
some cases these two may well be different, e.g., where the buyer takes delivery at a
railway siding and then brings the goods to his plant. As the distance between the
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by the seller, the market price is fixed as of the place for tender. 89
In one Code jurisdiction the special statute of limitations of section
2-725 apparently went unnoticed by the bar." In order to prevent such
an occurrence elsewhere it is appropriate to note here that the Code
assimilates into the contract statute of limitations all warranty actions. 9'
Any action for breach of a contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after it has accrued. Under the Code the cause of action
accrues at the time that the breach occurs and thus knowledge of the
plaintiff is irrelevant. For warranty actions a rule stating that the
breach occurs when tender is made may seem to have a harsh effect upon
the running of the statute of limitations in actions based on breach of
warranty of title. The buyer may not know about the defective title until
the four-year period of limitations has passed. Nonetheless, t]e Code
statutory period will run, and the buyer will be precluded from pursuing
his immediate vendor on a warranty theory. The doctrine is based on
the familiar notion that finality in commercial transactions is a desirable
goal of the law. Of course, where any warranty explicitly extends to
future performance and discovery of the breach must await the time of
such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should be discovered. 93
C. Buyer's Notice and Preservation of Goods in Dispute
More is required of the buyer who rejects than of the buyer who
revokes acceptance in connection with the question of notice. In both
of these situations, however, the buyer is using a form of self-help, and
he is required to send some kind of notice to the seller. In addition,
siding and plant increases, the likelihood of a different market also increases. UCC
§ 2-714, comment 3, suggests further that the time and place of acceptance is determined
as of the buyer's decision not to revoke where the buyer would be justified in revoking
acceptance.
89 UCC § 2-713(2). See UCC § 2-503 for the seller's duty in connection with tender.
The Code liberalizes the rules of evidence on market quotations (UCC § 2-724; N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 375-a), permits a substitute market (UCC § 2-723(2)), and gives recogni-
tion to third party documents authorized by the contract (UCC § 1-202).
90 Cunningham, "Statutes of Limitations in Confusion," 46 Mass. L.Q. 13 (1961). But
see annotation to UCC § 2-725, Special Supplement to the Mass. Ann. Laws, containing
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106 (1961).
91 There is a two-step chain of reasoning here. The four-year. period is stated for "an
action for breach of any contract for sale," and the only explicit mention of the warranty
occurs in defining the time of breach. Nonetheless it seems clear that the Code treats
warranty liability as a breach of contract. See UCC § 2-711(1).
92 UCC § 2-312, comment 2, states that the breach of warranty of good title is not
one which extends to "future performance of the goods."
93 Some difficulty may come from the requirement that the warranty must extend
to future performance "explicitly." Note that the comment to UCC § 2-725 does not
use the term. In one sense the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness "explicitly"
extend to future performance under the Code standards. See UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315. Com-
pare Ezer, supra note 25. See also, Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co.,
11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
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under section 2-607 the buyer may be cut off from any remedy by failing
to notify the seller of a breach within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered the defect.94 Thus, the Code requires a notice
of the fact that the transaction is unsatisfactory and a notice of the
buyer's choice is a self-help remedy. We shall shortly see that these
notices may be combined.
Any claim for a defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection
and which could have been cured by the seller may be lost to the rejecting
buyer if he fails to state that defect in his notice.9" Until the limits of
the seller's right to cure are more completely worked out, it would seem
advisable to counsel a buyer to state all of these patent defects at the
time of rejection. The comment states that the section is not designed to
penalize buyers for omissions in their statements but that the purpose
is to protect a seller who is reasonably misled by the omission.9
In subsection (b) of section 2-605(1), the statute goes on to state a
specialized rule which applies only to transactions between merchants.
In these cases the seller may after rejection make a request in writing
for a full and final written statement of all defects on which the buyer
proposes to rely." The buyer who ignores this request in whole or in
part will also lose his right to claim a particular patent defect. Comment
3 states that this special merchant's rule is aimed at situations where
the time for cure has passed. The statute itself states no such limitations.
Consequently, in transactions between merchants even before the time for
cure has passed, the seller may be entitled to the benefits of both sub-
sections of section 2-605(1).
The buyer who seeks to revoke his acceptance is not precluded from
relying upon all defects which were discoverable at the time of accept-
ance. First, if the buyer reasonably assumed that the nonconformity
would be cured or if his acceptance was induced by the seller's assurances
of cure, the buyer may assert the defect even though it could be discov-
ered. Of course, defects which were difficult to discover at the time of
acceptance may be relied upon by the buyer when discovered.98 In addi-
tion, the comments indicate that the notification of revocation may also
be delayed for a considerable period of time because of the anticipated
series of discussions in attempting to adjust the dispute.99 This may also
94 UCC §§ 2-602, 2-605, 2-607, 2-608. Under UCC § 2-717 the buyer must also notify
the seller if he plans to deduct a part of the price for any breach of the same contract.
Uniform Sales Act § 69(1) permits such deduction only for a breach of warranty.
95 UCC § 2-605.
S6 UCC § 2-605, comment 1.
97 UCC § 2-605(1)(b).
98 UCC § 2-608. Uniform Sales Act § 69(3) made no exception to the required notice
of an election to rescind for breach of warranty.
99 UCC § 2-608, comment 4.
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be the explanation for the requirement for particularizing defects in the
notice of rejection.
From the buyer's viewpoint the most disastrous aspect of a failure
to send a notice is raised by section 2-607, which requires a notice of the
breach. Here the careless buyer may be precluded not only from revoking
his acceptance of the goods, but also from any remedy either by self-help
or litigation.110 In cases where the buyer seeks to revoke his acceptance,
this notice of breach may be contained in the notice of revocation. None-
theless, it is clear that this notice of breach can be separate and relatively
simple in content. Comment 4 to section 2-607 indicates that the content
of the notification need merely be sufficient to alert the seller that the
transaction is still troublesome.
Although the statute itself fails to make any distinction here between
the merchant class and the casual seller and buyer, the comment pro-
vides an interesting insight into the draftsmen's intent. It suggests that
a court, when ascertaining the time of notification in a retail-consumer
transaction, permit an extension of time to the buyer.10 Further, the
same comment suggests that in the merchant transaction the reasonable
time is to be judged by applying commercial standards to a merchant
buyer. Neither the definition of reasonable time in section 1-204 nor the
language of section 2-607 itself explicitly suggests these distinctions. 02
One novel provision of article 2 creates a right in either party to a
dispute to notify the other that he wishes to inspect, test, and sample
the goods, including those in the possession of the other party.03 It is
not certain under the Code what effect such a notice will have upon the
party's underlying rights. There is a general statement in section 1-106
that all rights under the Code are granted remedies. If a buyer, however,
is in full control of the goods in dispute and fails to comply with a re-
quest for inspection by the seller, there is nothing in the remedial sections
100 This is similar to the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act § 49 requiring the buyer
to notify the seller of any breach within a reasonable time. Note that under UCC § 2-717
permitting the buyer to deduct damages from any part of the price still due under the
same contract also requires a notice to the seller.
101 UCC § 2-607, comment 4. In an otherwise unreported case a Massachusetts court
indicated that in cases of breach of warranty injuring a beneficiary under UCC § 2-318,
no notice need be sent by the beneficiary. UCC § 2-607, comment 5, seems opposed to
this view. The case as reported only seems to hold that a brief notice which might be in-
sufficient if sent by a buyer may be adequate if sent by the third party. The holding
seems sensible since the third party would not know the details of the transaction. See
Menard v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., App. Div. Central D. Ct., Worcester, No. T-584,
Note, 47 Mass. L.Q. 190 (1962). It has been argued that notice should not be required for
a warranty liability imposed apart from the sales statutes. Prosser, "The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)," 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
102 Of course the facts involved appropriately suggest the adoption of these standards
through the test of "reasonableness."
103 UCC § 2-515.
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of the sales article which precludes the buyer from going forward with
his own law suit. 04
IV. WHAT MAY THE BUYER Do WHEN HE RECEIVES AN INADEQUATE
QUANTITY?
Thus far we have concentrated upon the problems related to the seller's
monetary liability and to the buyer's remedies when the goods do not
meet contract standards of quality. Many cases involve the situation
where a seller fails to deliver or to tender the agreed upon quantity of
goods. If the seller has the goods, the buyer may wish to capture those
goods specifically.
Under the prior law if title had passed to the buyer, he could seek one
of the legal remedies based upon a right to possession of the goods. 05
Replevin under the Code will in one sense be expanded and in another
sense cut down. The remedy is expanded because the buyer may be able
to bring a replevin action without any reference to his property or title
rights. This is so because the Code hinges the right to replevin, in part
at least, upon whether or not the goods have been "identified" to the
contract. 06 In general, identification of the goods to the contract may
occur at an earlier point in time than the passage of property under the
prior law.'07 The Code, however, also narrows the availability of replevin
to promote cover. The remedy of replevin is limited to those situations
where the buyer, after reasonable effort, is unable to effect cover or where
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavail-
ing1 °s Thus where cover is available, replevin will not be granted even
in cases where the title rules of the pre-Code law would have granted a
specific legal remedy to the buyer.
If the buyer fails in an attempt to use replevin, he may then seek
equitable relief. Most courts have been reluctant to expand the remedy
104 UCC § 2-711. ,
105 Uniform Sales'Act § 66. No mention is made of an action of conversion or
detention in the listing of the buyer's remedies in UCC § 2-711; but there is no evidence
that such remedies are excluded. Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 270, 284 (1960).
106 UCC § 2-716(3).
107 UCC § 2-501 spells out the tests for identification "in the absence of explicit
agreement." Compare Uniform Sales Act § 19 where rules of presumption operate "unless
a different intention appears. . . 2" Somewhat redundantly the Code provides that
identification occurs when the contract is made if it is for goods already existing and
identified. There is no requirement that the goods be in a deliverable state as under
Uniform Sales Act § 19(1). See UCC § 2-105 as to fungible goods. As to future goods
other than crops and "unborn young," identification occurs when the goods are "shipped,
marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers."
There is no requirement of an "appropriation" with the assent of the buyer. Uniform
Sales Act § 19(4).
108 UCC § 2-716(3). In one more situation of less general importance, this section
authorizes replevin, i.e., where the goods have been shipped under reservation by the
seller (UCC § 2-505) and the buyer has satisfied or tendered satisfaction of the seller's
security interest.
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of specific performance in the ordinary sale of goods. 109 One tool to
effectuate this policy was perhaps inadvertently created in the Uniform
Sales Act. Under section 68 of the Sales Act specific performance was
permitted only when the seller breached a contract to deliver "specific
or ascertained goods." Any contract involving future goods was thus
subject to a claim that the statute, at least inferentially, prohibited any
decree of specific performance."' The Code eliminates this statutory
provision. Section 2-716 merely states that specific performance may be
decreed where the goods are unique or "in other proper circumstances. " m
Comment 2 seems to indicate that the Code plans to expand the avail-
ability of the specific equitable remedy. It suggests that a new concept
of unique goods is introduced under the section. The availability of the rem-
edy must be determined in light of the total situation which characterizes
the contract. Output and requirements contracts involving a particular or
peculiarly available source are mentioned as the typical commercial situa-
tions for granting specific performance. Furthermore, the comments suggest
that the inability to cover under the Code is strong evidence of a proper cir-
cumstance for specific performance. Does this mean that specific per-
formance really involves the remedy for those cases where the goods are
not identified and where the buyer's ability to cover is questionable? In
other words, the presence of an ability to cover may well mean that
specific performance is not available. It seems quite doubtful that specific
performance would now be made available in situations where replevin
is no longer available because of a policy designed to encourage cover." 2
As an analogue of the pre-Code right of a defrauded seller to recapture
goods sold and delivered to the buyer, the Code in section 2-502 permits
the buyer to obtain identified goods from an insolvent seller." 3 The buyer
who makes an advance payment may still capture identified goods if he
-o9 Note, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 551 (1956).
110 See 3 Williston, supra note 66, at § 608. Lower courts in New York used this
argument repeatedly to deny specific relief, e.g., Blake v. Tyson Radio Hempstead Corp.,
103 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1951); Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc.,
188 Misc. 426, 65 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1946); Goodman v. Caplan, Inc.,
188 Misc. 242, 65 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946). Compare Doyle's Main
Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 118 N.Y.S2d 867 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1953).
1 It has been suggested that UCC § 2-716 will probably strengthen developments
favorable to specific performance of output and requirement contracts. Van Hecke,
"Changing Emphases In Specific Performance," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (1961). Compare
the dissent N & L Fur Co. v. Petkanas, 252 App. Div. 844, 299 N.Y. Supp. 901, 902
(1st Dep't 1937) and UCC § 2-306, comments 1, 2.
112 Cover, or the procurement of substitute goods by the aggrieved buyer, is not
mandatory; but the kind and amount of damages recoverable and the remedy of replevin
both hinge on the question of cover. UCC § 2-712, comment 3.
113 Insolvency is broadly defined in UCC § 1-201.(23):
A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within
the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law.
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discovers the seller's insolvency within ten days after receipt by the
seller of the first installment of the price. In some circumstances the
buyer may be the person who identifies the goods to the contract, and
in this case the Code requires that the goods conform to the contract in
order to protect the interests of third parties who have dealt with the
seller. The effect in bankruptcy of this Code rule is problematical, but
it will have application in the nonbankruptcy framework.,, 4
An earlier version of the Code gave the financing buyer a security
interest in the undelivered goods. 5 Since there was no public notice
of any such interests, the provision was abandoned to prevent deception
of other creditors. Under the present version of the Code the buyer
who wishes to obtain a full-dress security interest must comply with the
provisions of article 9.116 To the extent that any security interest arises
under article 2, however, the buyer is excused from complying with the
formalities, filing requirements, and default rules of article 9.11 The
question may arise as to whether or not the buyer's right to obtain goods
from an insolvent seller under section 2-502 is a security interest. It is
clear that any right which the buyer acquires as a result of this special
property interest is not a "security interest."'18
V. WHAT THE SELLER MAY Do WHEN THE BUYER BREACHES
A. Tender of Payment by the Buyer
By now the reader may have obtained the impression that only sellers
breach sales contracts. Obviously, buyers also fail to carry out their side
of sales agreements, and the Code contains another series of interrelated
rules to deal with this problem. In determining whether or not a particu-
lar buyer has wrongfully failed to pay, it will frequently be necessary
for lawyers to examine the law of tender. It has been well said that
tender is not a friendly business." 9 Frequently, a seller who wishes to
force a buyer to breach a contract in a rising market may insist at the
last moment upon legal tender. Sometimes this is not possible. The Code
114 The bankruptcy question is ably discussed in Kennedy, "The Trustee in Bankruptcy
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9,"
14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518, 556 (1960). The section should have force in connection with the
avoiding powers of an assignee for the benefit of creditors under such state laws as
N.Y. Debt. and Cred. Law § 15.
115 Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed. § 9-204(6) (Official Draft
1952).
116 It is important to note that the financing seller is given especially favorable treat-
ment under article 9 if he obtains a purchase money security interest; but the security
interest of the financing buyer is treated under the general provisions of the article. See
Hogan, "Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code,"
3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 115 (1962).
117 UCC § 9-113.
118 UCC § 1-120(37).
119 Braucher & Sutherland, Commercial Transactions 58 (2d ed. 1958).
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in section 2-511 makes tender of payment sufficient when it is made
by any means or in any manner "current in the ordinary course of
business." The seller is still permitted to insist upon legal tender, but he
must demand such a tender and allow a reasonable time for the buyer
to comply. It is not remiss at this point to indicate the similarity between
the buyer's power to "cure," here expressed in terms of tender of pay-
ment, and the seller's power to cure under section 2-508 when the goods
do not conform.120  In both situations the Code approach encourages
the completion of the deal by eliminating technical and commercially
insignificant objections to continued performance. Another frequently
discussed question relates to the effect of the use of a check upon the
underlying debt.'21 The Code in section 2-511 in effect states that pay-
ment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by
dishonor of the check on due presentment. Thus upon dishonor the seller
would have both his remedies on the check and his remedies under the
sales article.12
2
B. The Seller's Right to Complete the Process of Manufacture
One of the most vexing problems of the pre-Code law involved the
seller who received a notice of repudiation from the buyer while the goods
were in the process of being produced. The Sales Act provided that in
such a situation the buyer should not be liable to the seller for "greater
damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing toward
carrying out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's
repudiation or countermand.' 12 3 Thus the seller was confronted with a
dilemma. If he failed to go forward with the production, he disrupted
his manufacturing schedule, and in some cases he would be forced to sell
for salvage materials which might be more economically used in his regu-
lar production. Occasionally some buyers even suggested, at least in
appellate arguments, that sellers might have a duty to go forward and
finish the goods.'24 The seller's duty to mitigate damages did not go
120 See text accompanying note 56, supra.
121 This problem must be kept distinct from the issues related to the rights of a bona
fide purchaser for value from one who obtained the goods by tendering a subsequently
dishonored check. UCC § 2-403(1)(b) protects the purchaser in this frequently dis-
cussed problem. Corman, "Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser,"
10 Vand. L. Rev. 55 (1956); Vold, "Worthless Check Sales, Substantially Simultaneous
and Conflicting Analogies, 1 Hastings L.J. 111 (1950); Note, 62 Yale U.. 101 (1952).
122 The general Code treatment of this question in UCC § 3-802 is in accord. Note
that an opposite result is called for when the holder procures certification of the check.
UCC § 3-802, comment 2; UCC § 3-411.
123 Uniform Sales Act § 64(4).
124 See Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930); Roland & Whytock v. Rex
Mfg. Co., 49 R.I. 168, 141 AUt. 310 (1928). See also Estes v. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp.,
191 App. Div. 719; 182 N.Y. Supp. 25 (4th Dep't 1920).
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that far. The seller's real problem came when he elected to complete
the goods in process.
Fundamentally, the breaching buyer had an opportunity to use limited
hindsight against the seller in these situations. 2 , The Code makes clear
in subsection 2 of section 2-704 that the seller's conduct is to be
judged under standards of reasonable commercial judgment at the
time that he takes action. The comments indicate that the seller may
complete manufacture of the goods subject to attack by the buyer who
can show that the seller's conduct was not commercially reasonable. 26
Another important feature of this remedy is the right to identify even
after the notice of repudiation. If the seller has conforming goods in his
possession and control at the time he learns of the breach, he may iden-
tify those goods to the contract.2 7 In addition, goods which are unfin-
ished may be completed and identified to the contract if "they have been
demonstrably intended for the particular contract.' 28 In the latter case
the seller is only authorized to treat such future goods as the subject
matter of a resale under section 2-706, while in the former case apparently
all the remedies associated with identified goods are available.
C. The Seller's Action for the Price
In the same fashion as the section dealing with the buyer's rights to
capture the goods specifically, the Code treatment of the action for the
price seems to be based upon a notion that it is commercially desirable
to promote resale of goods where one party has failed to conform to his
contract obligations. First, the seller is authorized to recover the price
for accepted goods or for conforming goods lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after the risk has passed to the buyer.2 9
This clearly substitutes the more easily ascertained test of acceptance
for the pre-Code rules of property passage as a criterion for price
recovery.
3 0
Second, the seller may recover the contract price for identified goods
only when he is unable to resell after reasonable effort.'3 ' Since, as we
125 Some courts expressed the rule rather harshly, e.g., Zimmerman Radio Corp. v.
Bronson & Townsend Co., 108 Conn. 632, 144 Atl. 301 (1929). Others indicated that a
reasonable judgment by the seller would be safeguarded. Buchman v. Millvile Mfg. Co., 17
F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927).
126 UCC 2-704, comment 2. Note that the section itself only refers to the completion
of manufacture while comment indicates -that the seller has the power to complete "manu-
facture or procurement of goods."
127 UCC § 2-704(1) (a).
128 UCC § 2-704(1)(b).
129 UCC § 2-709(1).
130 Uniform Sales Act § 63. Acceptance under the Code does not occur until the buyer
has bad a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods so long as the buyer refrains from
doing an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. See UCC § 2-606.
13 UCC § 2-709(2). In addition the seller need not make the effort to resell if "the
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shall see below, the seller's right to resell goods in his possession is sub-
stantially enlarged under the Code, it is important to consider the prob-
lem which will arise when the seller sues for the price and is able to re-
sell the goods prior to the collection of the judgment.3 In such a
case the seller may resell at any time prior to the actual collection of
the judgment, and the buyer must be credited with the proceeds of the
resale.133
The final avenue for price recovery by the seller rests in section
2-709(1) (a). If conforming goods are lost or damaged within a com-
mercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer,
the seller may recover the price.
3 4
D. The Seller's Action for Damages
Although the Code somewhat limits the seller's ability to recover the
price, his power to resell the goods and thus fix his damages is increased.
First, the Code permits such resale not only where the buyer has failed
to make a required payment, but also where the breach was in the form
of a wrongful rejection of the goods or a repudiation of the contract.'35
Second, the right to resell arises in all cases and not merely where the
goods are perishable, or the right of resale is expressly reserved, or where
the buyer has been in default an unreasonable time.3 1
While the Sales Act required only that a resale be made with "reason-
able care and judgment," the Code states more specifically the standards
for a resale: "in good faith and in commercially reasonable manner."' 37
The resale may be by the unit or in parcels; it may be made by one or
more contracts or by performing an already existing contract with a third
person. The sale may be public or private; but if it is private, the buyer
must in all cases be notified.3 8 A public sale and its requirements are
spelled out in even more detail.3 9 Furthermore, the price obtained at
such a resale will probably be enhanced by the greater protection ex-
tended to any good faith purchaser at such a sale. Under the Sales Act
circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." UCC § 2-709(1) (b).
Compare Uniform Sales Act § 63(3), authorizing price recovery when the goods "cannot be
resold for a reasonable price."
132 See D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147 N.E. 15 (1925).
133 UCC § 2-709(2).
'34 UCC § 2-709(1)(b). The N.Y. Law Revision Commission had criticized the
original section because no time limit was placed upon the seller's possession of the con-
forming goods at the buyer's risk. The Code now contains the reasonable time limit.
1956 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), p. 398.
15 UCC §§ 2-706, 2-703. Compare, Uniform Sales Act § 60(1).
136 Uniform Sales Act § 60.
137 UCC §,2-706(1).
i3 In a public sale, notice to the buyer of the time and place of the sale is excused
if the goods are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily. UCC § 2-706(4).
139 Compare UCC §§ 9-504(3), 7-210, 7-308.
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the purchaser was only protected where the sale was made as authorized
by the statute.'40  The Code protects the good faith purchaser even
where the seller violates the requirements of the statute.'
41
The seller is not required to make the resale provided for in section
2-706. Recovery of the difference between the market price and the
unpaid contract price is specifically permitted by section 2-708. Further-
more, if that measure of damages is inadequate to put the seller in as
good a position as performance, then the measure of damages may be
the profit which the seller would have made from full performance by
the buyer. 42 In the latter case dealers in fixed price items will be able
to recover, in the words of the comment, "the list price less cost to the
dealer or list price less manufacturing costs to the manufacturer.'1143
Incidental damages may be recovered by the seller either in the case of
a resale or in the case where he attempts to use the market price as the
measure of his recovery. 44
A third avenue is open for measuring recovery by an aggrieved seller.
The liquidated damages provisions of section 2-718 would clearly permit
the seller to utilize such a clause so long as the damages were not un-
reasonably large. 45 That section also contains another limitation on the
seller's ability to recoup. Provision is made for avoiding the for-
feiture of a fairly large prior payment by a defaulting buyer. The gener-
ally callous attitude which the courts have displayed toward a plaintiff
in default has been frequently criticized and, in New York, has been
affected by a statutory enactment amending the Sales Act to permit the
buyer to recapture a limited amount of any down payment notwithstand-
ing his default. 4 The Code follows this same approach, permitting
the seller to retain a fixed amount of the value of the total performance.' 47
In addition, the buyer's right to recovery may be reduced further by the
140 Uniform Sales Act § 60(2).
141 UCC § 2-706(5).
142 UCC § 2-708(2). Note that the profit recovery specifically includes reasonable
overhead. Compare the pre-Code approach denying any profit recovery for fixed price
items in Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1937).
143 UCC § 2-708, comment 2.
144 UCC § 2-710. Under UCC § 1-106 neither penal nor consequential damages may be
accrued unless specifically provided in the Code or some other rule of law.
145 See text accompanying note 80, supra for a discussion of UCC § 2-718.
146 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a. Compare Bisner v. Mantell, 197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d
793 (County Ct. Rensselaer County 1950). It has been generally held that § 44(1) of the
Uniform Sales Act authorized a defaulting seller to recover for any partial deliveries less
damages. See, Corman, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under
Sales Contract," 34 Texas L. Rev. 582 (1956).
147 The Code differs from the New York statute in two respects: (1) The Code calls for
retention by the seller in all cases of $500 or 20% of the price, whichever is smaller, while
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a permits retention of 201 of the price; (2) the Code requires
the application of UCC § 2-706 on the conduct of a resale by a seller who was partially paid
in goods.
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seller's ability to recover damages and by the value of any benefits
received by the buyer under the contract.148 Thus some of the sting is
taken out of the harsh rules dealing with the lay-away plan, but at the
same time the Code rules should not encourage breaching buyers to start
law suits to recapture small down payments.
E. The Seller's Power to Control the Goods
Section 2-703, the catalogue of the seller's remedies, permits the ag-
grieved seller, upon the buyer's default, to withhold delivery of the goods
and to cancel any executory obligation under the contract. By extending
the pre-Code principle of the seller's lien, the Code also permits the seller
to stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or any other
bailee when the goods are in carload, truckload, planeload, or larger
shipments of express or freight.1 4  For smaller shipments the Code re-
tains the requirement of the prior law that the buyer must be insolvent
to permit recapture of goods in the hands of a carrier or other bailee.15o
The Code, in the insolvency situation, also permits the aggrieved seller
to refuse delivery of goods in his control except for cash payments, includ-
ing payment for goods previously delivered under the contract. 5 ' This
provision protects the seller even where he had originally contracted for
a credit transaction.
If a seller wishes to obtain even greater power over the goods, he may
reserve a security interest, for example, by procuring a negotiable bill
of lading covering the goods.' 52 In addition, the seller may comply with
the formalities of article 9 and retain a purchase money security interest
which will entitle him to rather special protections under that article.15 3
Failing in this approach to the problem, the seller may be confronted
by the problem of the buyer's insolvency after the buyer has received
possession of the goods. In this event the prior law frequently permitted
the seller to recapture the goods from the buyer even in the absence of
an express security arrangement. 54 The basis for the recovery was usu-
ally the fraud of the buyer in purchasing goods on credit while he was
insolvent. The requirements of a representation forming the basis of
148 If the seller is entitled to liquidated damages, that amount may be retained by
the seller in lieu of the amount fixed by the statute. UCC § 2-718(2) (a).
149 UCC § 2-705. Uniform Sales Act §§ 57, 58 did not authorize stoppage against any
bailee.
150 Uniform Sales Act § 57; UCC § 2-705 (1).
151 UCC § 2-702(1). See -also UCC §§ 2-703, 2-705.
152 UCC § 2-505. See also UCC §§ 2-506, 2-707.
153 The purchase-money security interest is treated with special favor by UCC § 9-302
(filing excused in certain cases), by UCC § 9-301 (delayed filing permitted), and by UCC§ 9-312 (3) and (4) (special priority rules). See Hogan, supra note 116.
154 3 Williston, Sales §§ 636-37 (rev. ed. 1948).
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this fraud were rather elastic."'s Section 2-702 provides that the seller
may recapture goods from a buyer who receives them on credit while
insolvent if the seller demands the goods within ten days after the receipt
by the buyer. No representation is required in this situation, but the
ten-day period will prevent many sellers from utilizing the remedy pro-
vided in the prior law. The Code, therefore, further provides that if a
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery, the time limitation does not
apply. The effect in bankruptcy of this Code approach is somewhat
debatable.1 56 Where proceedings devoted to the liquidation of an in-
solvent estate are conducted in a state court, the Code rule will of course
have its full bite . 57 Although the Code usually does not adopt any
notion of election of remedies, subsection 3 of section 2-702 specifically
provides that successful reclamation excludes all other remedies with
respect to the goods. Comment 3 indicates that this election rule is
adopted because the right to reclaim the goods constitutes preferential
treatment as against the buyer's other creditors.
VI. THE RIGHTS OF THUmD PAnTIs
A. Bona Fide Purchasers for Value
1. The Problem of Void and Voidable Titles
Under the Code and the Sales Act a seller with a voidable title has
power to transfer complete title to a good faith purchaser for value. s
Clarification is a major contribution of the Code in this area. Several
troublesome cases under the pre-Code law are isolated in section
2-403(1), and the bona fide purchaser is protected in each of these cases.
For example, whether a sale is a technical cash sale or whether the
delivery was in exchange for a subsequently dishonored check, the first
buyer obtains a sufficient capacity to transfer title to an innocent third
party for value. In addition, the Code rejects any distinction based upon
the criminal law test of larceny and embezzlement. 5 9
155 The misrepresentation might concern the buyer's credit status or his intent to pay.
In Matter of Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1939); Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N.Y. 212,
163 N.E. 737 (1928); Whitten v. Fitzwater, 129 N.Y. 626, 29 N.E. 298 (1891); Hotchkin v.
Third Natl Bank, 127 N.Y. 329, 27 N.E. 1050 (1891).
156 The effect of § 2-702 is ably discussed in Kennedy, supra note 114, at 556. See also
45 Cornell L.Q. 566 (1960). To avoid an interpretation that the section subjects the seller's
claim to the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, the Code has been amended in Illinois and
New York to delete a rather ambiguous reference to lien creditors in UCC § 2-702(3).
This change is designed to leave the question to non-Code law as in Matter of Kravitz, 279
F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960). See Hawkland, "The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and De-
frauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz
Case" 67 Com. LJ. 86 (1962).
157 See for example N.Y. Debt. and Cred. Law § 15 (assignments for the benefit of
creditors).
158 UCC § 2-403(1) and Uniform Sales Act § 23.
159 See Phelps v. McQuade 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917). Compare Stanton Motor
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2. The Seller Remaining in Possession of Sold Goods
One of the several avenues to legal safety open to a buyer who is
duped into purchasing a third party's goods is contained in section 25
of the Uniform Sales Act. Under that rule a second buyer could prevail
over an earlier buyer if he could show that he received and paid for the
goods after the earlier purchaser had permitted the seller to continue to
appear as the owner by leaving the goods in the seller's control. Articu-
lating the standards for the application of the principle of apparent
ownership in this framework proved to be quite difficult. Whether a
subsequent mortgagee or pledgee would qualify as a member of the pro-
tected class was not specifically answered in the Uniform Sales Act. 6
In addition, the requirement that the second buyer must have paid for
and received the goods before the first buyer took delivery left open the
possibility of a commercially senseless race by the diligent to obtain
delivery of the goods.
In section 2-403(2) and (3) the Code preserves and strengthens the
principle of ostensible ownership. The protected class is clearly defined
by limiting the group to "buyers in ordinary course of business." This
term is an important concept in the Code and is defined in section 1-201 (9).
Subsequent secured creditors are clearly not protected by the Code
rule. Furthermore, in order to qualify for the protection the innocent
buyer must show that he purchased his goods from a seller who deals
with goods of the kind sold.61
The Code settles another troublesome question by its concept definition
of "buyer in ordinary course of business." The extensive use of the
credit sale is recognized by the Code when a buyer is considered as in
the ordinary course even if he purchases on secured or unsecured credit.
The major issue not resolved by the Code statement of the rule is
whether the second buyer has a duty to take delivery before he can
take precedence over the interest of the first buyer. Neither the operative
provision of section 2-403, nor the definition of the protected buyer group,
directly answers this question. In other situations where the same
terminology is employed, the requirement of delivery to the second
buyer has been imposed.162
The Code rules on retention of possession by the seller also create a
new limitation. In order to take advantage of the protection afforded,
Corp. v. Rosetti, 11 App. Div. 2d 296, 203 N.Y.S.2d 273 (3d Dep't 1960), with Damis v.
Barcia, 266 App. Div. 698, 40 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1943). See Weber, "The Extension
of the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code," 49 Ky. L.J. 437, 468 n.90 (1961).
160 See McGann v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 89 A.2d 123 (1952).
161 UCC § 2-403(2) and UCC § 1-201(9).
162 United States v. Kerr Gifford & Co., 136 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Idaho 1956).
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the buyer must show that he has purchased from a "merchant." Thus,
when a sale is made on a casual basis by one who has no regular course
of dealings with the kind of property sold, the protections of the bona
fide purchaser will not be found in the entrusting with possession rules
of article 2.163
3. The Expansion of the Protection of Innocent Purchasers-
Other Forms of Entrusting
The Code rule dealing with sellers remaining in possession of sold
goods is merely one aspect of a larger policy decision in Article 2.
One of the persistent struggles under prior law was the conflict between
the "true owner" and the bona fide purchaser of property sold or
transferred by an unauthorized vendor. To protect the owner is to
recognize traditional property values; to protect the bona fide purchaser
is to promote the transfer and flow of goods. The Factor's Act, the
rules of agency dealing with ostensible ownership, and the various pro-
visions of chattel security laws protecting purchasers where the goods
are held for resale-indicate the law is moving toward a concept of
negotiability of goods.-6  Simply put, the Code provides that any en-
trusting of possession to a merchant is sufficient to empower that
merchant to sell the goods to a buyer in ordinary course of business.6 5
Thus, the watch left with the jeweler and the car left with a dealer for
repairs may be effectively, albeit illegally, sold by the dealer. Although
the bald statement of the rule may be shocking at first blush, it clearly
does not promote the activities of the criminal "fence." The dealer
acquires only the power to transfer the interest of the person who
initially entrusted the goods. Stolen property, therefore, will not move
more freely because of the Code rule. The provision should be tested
in light of the fact that it is practically impossible to recapture goods
which have moved into the marketing system through a dishonest
dealer.
Finally, there is practical impact upon the successful and efficient
marketing of goods arising from a rule protecting innocent purchasers.
Speed in each individual transaction is obviously obtained. To the extent
that any buyer is aware of the law or of any risk of title, his fears
should be allayed. Most people dealing in this fashion probably give
little or no thought to the problem of title at all. At the crux of the
163 UCC § 2-403(1) dealing with voidable title will safeguard such purchasers.
164 Gilmore, "The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase," 63 Yale L.J. 1057
(1954).
165 UCC § 2-403(2). See Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 NXE.2d 871
(1953) (applied N.J. law to protect bona fide purchaser from a dealer entrusted with pos-
session when slight evidence of owner's responsibility for appearances of authority).
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problem are two innocent parties-the entruster and the ultimate buyer,
both of whom have been equally duped by the middleman, the dealer.
Trying to solve this problem by resort to equitable maxims is a fruit-
less undertaking. We are really and truthfully engaged in determining
which is the more important: the ownership rights of the entruster or
the commercial expectations of the buyer and the buying group."6 The
Code votes for the protection of the buying group and in so doing
avoids much of the difficulty inherent in the technical and troublesome
distinctions of the prior law.
B. Creditors Under Article 11
1. Creditors of the Buyer
If the buyer becomes involved with a third person who obtains a
judgment against him while the goods are in the possession of the seller,
may that third person capture the goods and subject them to his
judgment? A search of the specific rules which the Code substitutes
for the property concept reveals no answers to this problem. At this
point we must utilize the title provisions of the Code. These are set
forth in UCC section 2-401. The presumptions which control in the
absence of an explicit agreement are generally clearer and more simple
than the tests under prior law. If the contract is a destination contract,
title will not pass until the goods arrive at that point. If the contract
is a shipment contract, title passes at the time and place of shipment.
Where the goods are not to be moved and are identified at the time
of contracting, title passes at the place and time of contracting except
where documents of title are involved. In the latter case title will not
pass until the delivery of the documents takes place. If the creditors'
rights in this framework are to be tested by section 2-401(2), there
should be little difficulty with the problem.
2. Creditors of the Seller Who Remains in Possession of Sold Goods
The Uniform Sales Act provided no rule for determining the rights
of the seller's creditors to goods left in his possession. Actually, the
question was left entirely to nonuniform state law.'67 This abdication
of responsibility was due to the diverse state law on the question. In
very general terms, the division was between those jurisdictions which
held that any retention of possession by the seller was fraudulent as
against the seller's creditors as a matter of law, and those jurisdictions
166 See Vold, Law of Sales 179-84 (2d ed. 1959).
167 Uniform Sales Act § 26.
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which held that the retention was evidence of fraud only.' One-half
century later the Code develops little more in this connection. Again
the matter is left to the state law of fraudulent conveyances.' 6 9 The
one exception permits a merchant-seller to retain the goods in the
current course of trade for a commercially reasonable time.'7" The
exception, buries the possibility that a creditor of the seller could
automatically reach the piano left to be tuned after purchase, the car
left to be serviced after purchase, or the steam shovel which has not
moved until sometime after purchase.'
3. Consignments
When a manufacturer places goods in the possession of a dealer
for resale, he frequently uses the consignment device. The papers in-
volved state that the supplier of the goods retains full ownership rights
and that the dealer may retain part of the ultimate sale price as his
commission. The consignment is a useful marketing tool to induce
distributors to take on new products, but the rights of third parties
dealing with the possessor of the goods constantly troubled the courts.' 72
Bona fide purchasers from the dealer were safeguarded by the Factor's
Act. 173  Creditors of the dealer, however, were frequently unable to
attach or levy upon the goods, even when they relied on the dealer's
apparent ownership. 74 Of course, if it could be established that the
consignment merely masked a security transaction, the general creditors
could reach the goods on the basis of a failure to record under a chattel
mortgage or conditional sales act. 7 5
Under the Code a bona fide purchaser will be protected by reason of
-the entrusting rule of section 2-403. When creditors assert claims against
consigned goods, the Code calls for a determination of whether the
transaction falls within the definition of "security interest."' 76 If
the parties intend to create a security interest in the consigned
168 The complete spectrum of views is collected in 2 Williston, supra note 154, at §
353-404.
169 A 1934 survey suggests that the enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act did not affect this area, even though § 7 thereof provides: "Every conveyance made
and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in
law ... is fraudulent ... ." MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 255 (1956).
170 UCC § 2-402(2) and comment 2.
171 Note, 104 U.'Pa. L. Rev. 91, 97 (1955).
172 One commentator implies that courts have demonstrated a hostility toward consign-
ments because of the possible injury to creditors. Hawkland, "Consignment Selling Under
the Uniform Commercial Code," 67 Com. L.J. 146, 147 (1962).
173 See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, § 43.
174 Hogan, "The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Massachusetts Variety," 38 B.U.L. Rev. 571, 575 (1958). Annot., 63 A.L.R. 355 (1929).
175 Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939); Taylor v. Fram, 252 Fed. 465
(2d Cir. 1918). See also 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 1089 n.19, 1095 n.28 (14th rev. ed. 1959).
176 UCC § 1-201(37).
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goods, article 9 of the Code will be brought into play, and the
rights of third parties will be governed by the various rather specific
rules in that area.117 If the device is not initially classified as
,a security interest, section 2-326(3) will still require a certain amount
of notoriety for the protection of creditors. If the bailee maintains a
place of business in which he deals in the kind of goods consigned, under
a name other than that of the supplier, this section requires compliance
with standards designed to warn creditors of the bailee. First, if the
jurisdiction has an appropriate sign-posting law, the supplier may protect
his consignment by compliance with that statute. Second, the supplier
may alternatively file under article 9 of the Code. Third, if the supplier
has failed to comply with either of these relatively simple notice require-
ments, he may prevail against creditors by establishing that the bailee
is generally known to his creditors as being substantially engaged in
selling the goods of others. 78
Of the three avenues filing under article 9 seems to be the most
attractive and simple. Many jurisdictions have no sign-posting statute,
and compliance with such requirements often means that the creditors
do not know of the transaction. 9 From a counseling viewpoint the
provision permitting the supplier to establish the bailee's reputation in
the trade is filled with the risks of an adverse fact-finding in subsequent
litigation. The only difficulty raised by an article 9 filing stems from
the possibility that the fact of filing will be the basis of an argument that
the transaction does fall within the ambit of the definition of security
interest. Any statement filed under article 9 should, therefore, clearly
indicate on its face that the filing is made to comply with section 2-326.
Otherwise, the supplier may find that his rights are entirely governed
by article 9, including the default rules of part 5.180
4. The Creditor and Bulk Transfers Under Article 6
The bulk sales provisions of the Code bring uniformity to this area
for the first time. The basic purpose is to protect creditors of a merchant
377 For a brief introduction to article 9, see Coogan, "How to Create Security Interests
Under the Code-And Why," 48 Cornell L.Q. 131 (1962).178 In the absence of any of the three factors, UCC § 2-326(3) makes the consignment a
"sale or return" and thus subjects the goods to the claims of creditors. UCC 2-326(1) also
adopts specific tests for determining whether a transaction is a sale or return (delivered
primarily for resale), or a sale on approval (delivered primarily for use).
'79 Arizona, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia have such statutes.
3 CCH Condit. Sale-Chat. Mort. Rep. ff 6407 (under each state) (1962). The fact that
trade credit may be extended without examination of the debtor's stock is apparently one
element in the general repeal of sign posting requirements in the various factor's lien acts.
See Moore & Kupfer "Factor's Liens and Accounts Receivable-Current Developments,"
12 Bus. Law. 482 (1957).
180 See UCC §§ 9-504 through 9-507 for the limitations placed upon the secured party
in realizing upon the collateral.
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who sells out his stock to anyone for any price, pockets the proceeds,
and disappears.' The other major credit risk resulting from the debtor's
dishonesty, the fraudulent conveyance, will continue to be governed by
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the case law of the enacting
state.8 The bulk sales article merely provides creditors with notice
of the transaction before it takes place. The creditors will then be able
to determine in advance whether they should try to stop the transfer
or avail themselves of remedies which could reach the proceeds of the
transfer. The prior statutes are varied and somewhat confusing; the
main effect of the Code will be to clarify this important area of com-
mercial law. 83
(a) What Is a Bulk Transfer? Isolating the kinds of transfers which
come within the requirements of the statute will continue to involve a
close reading of the statute and a study of the case law. Certain trans-
actions are explicitly exempted from the requirements.8 4 Others are
expressly included for the first time. In all included cases there will be
the problem of determining whether or not it is a bulk transfer out of
the ordinary course of business.
Perhaps a more specific problem will help demonstrate the kind of
transfer at which the Code aims.
If one supermarket in a national chain is located in a Code juris-
diction and that store is sold by the chain, section 6-102 seems to require
compliance with the notice and inventory standards. Bulk transfer
is defined as "any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of
the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies,
merchandise or other inventory of an enterprise subject to this Article.""'88
181 UCC § 6-101, Comment 2. The Code repeals N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44 (bulk sales),
and N.Y. Lien Law § 230-- (bulk mortgages).
182 See N.Y. Debt. and Cred. Law §§ 270-81.
183 Billig, "Article 6-Order Out of Chaos; A Bulk Transfer Article Emerges," 1952
Wis. L. Rev. 312. One of -the best brief discussions of the article is Horvitz & Wekstein,
"Article 6: Bulk Transfers," 1957 Ann. Survey Mass. L. §§ 7.1-7.7. Hawkland, Sales and
Bulk Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code 164 (1958 ed.).
184 Bulk transfers by auction sales are plainly subjected to the statute. UCC § 6-107.
Eight classes of exceptions are listed in UCC § 6-103. Briefly summarized these exceptions
fall into three categories: (1) Where creditors have other means of protection-security
transfers, general assignments, sales by executors and other officers; (2) where creditors
have no assertable interests--exempt property, transfers in settlement of a Hen; and (3)
where creditors have a substituted asset such as an assumption promise from the transferee-
There may be a nonstatutory exception resulting from the use of documents of title to
effect the transfer. See, Exeter Mfg. Co. v. Glass-Craft Boats, Inc., 103 N.H. 385, 173 A.2d
791 (1961). The most strenuously debated exception is the omission of security transfers.
See statement of Professor Bunn before the New York Law Revision Commission, 1954 N.Y-
Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 654.
185 UCC § 6-102(1). Defining "in bulk" and "not in the ordinary course of the trans-
feror's business" will continue to require a case-by-case determination. Sternberg v. Ruben-
stein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953). Annots., 33 A.L.R. 62 (1924); 36 A.L.R.2d
1141 (1954). The Code term "major part" is said to mean more than one-half of the
transferor's total stock. See, Miller, "Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to be Attached to the
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In our problem case the enterprise subject to this Article will be the
single store in the chain. Since all of the inventory of that store is to
be sold and since this is apparently not a regular part of a supermarket's
business, the necessary notices must be sent. Furthermore, the accom-
panying transfer of equipment in the store will be classified as part of
the bulk transfer, since it will be made in connection with a bulk transfer
of inventory.'88
One feature of the definition of bulk transfer may prove to be trouble-
some. Enterprises subject to the article are those whose principal business
is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture
what they sell. Some readers may include in this category any and all
manufacturers. It has been suggested that the "including" clause
modifies only the introductory provision and thus covers only manu-
facturers who sell from stock, such as a bakery store with its own baking
facilities.18
7
(b) The Creditors Protected. A second major question in the bulk
sales area concerns the classification of particular creditors as within
or without the group protected by the act. The operative section of
article 6 makes a transfer in violation of the requirements "ineffective
against any creditor of the transferor."88 Creditor is broadly defined
in section 1-201(12). Furthermore, section 6-109 specifies that the
creditors protected are those "holding claims based on transactions or
events occurring before the bulk transfer." The use of the word "claims"
in this section may result in the inclusion of all creditors who have
claims in tort or contract, liquidated or unliquidated, secured or un-
secured, contingent or fixed, presently due or not. 89 Furthermore,
comment 1 to that section specifically indicates that creditors with
unliquidated claims are within the group protected. Another reason
for concluding that the group is a broad one is the fact that under
section 6-104 the required list of creditors must include persons who
hold disputed claims.
In ascertaining which of the transferor's creditors may take advantage
of the bulk sales provisions, the counselor will be faced with two
Quantitative and Qualitative Requirements, Phrases of the Statutes," 1954 Wash. U.L.Q.
283, 313.
186 UCC § 6-102(2). Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44 covering transfers "of fixtures,
or merchandise and of fixtures." Under the Code a sale of equipment alone is never subject
to the article. Miller, "Bulk Sales Laws: Property Included," 1954 Wash. U.L.Q. 132, 173.
187 Hawkland, supra note 183, at 167. See also, Cation, "The Illinois Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Article 6-Bulk Transfers," 50 Il1. B. J. 292 (1961).
388 UCC § 6-104. See also UCC § 6-105, Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1962).
189 Miller, "The Effect of -the Bulk Sales Article on Existing Commercial- Practices,"
16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 267, 280 (1951). New York case law is contra, e.g., Wolfe v.
Bellfair Hat Co. 47 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944).
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questions of timing. Quite plainly, if a specific credit is extended after
the required notice to creditors is given, the transfer may proceed
without concern for that individual creditor. 90 In this connection the
principal problem will be to determine whether the creditor became
such before or after the notice.
Several difficult questions arise, however, in testing the status of
creditors who hold claims based on transactions or events occurring
"before the bulk transfer." What is meant by "before the bulk transfer"?
Is the crucial time the time of possesion, the time of payment, or the
time the goods are identified under section 2-501 ?'91
Another vexing problem deals with the creditor who holds a claim
against the transferor and who is omitted from the compulsory list
of creditors. This problem can become significant in the case of a-
wholly innocent omission or when the transferor is dishonest and deliber-
ately claims that he has few or no creditors. The Code protects the
transferee and specifically permits him to rely upon the representations
of the transferor. 92 Once again the desirability of allowing transfers
to go forward outweighs the value of protecting the omitted creditor.
In no event is the rule designed to help the transferor escape so that
some sanctions should be available against him. Money liability will
be of little value if the transferor flees or is insolvent as a result of the
sale. 93 Effective weapons in this situation are a criminal sanction against
the misrepresenting transferor or the optional Code provision requiring
the transferee to apply the proceeds of the sale to the debts.'94
(c) What Are the Requirements for Compliance? Since the purpose
of the bulk sale law is to enable existing creditors to take action in advance
of a pending transfer, it is essential that those creditors be actually
notified of the proposed transfer and of what is being sold. The first
requirement is stated in section 6-104, dealing with the preparation of
a list of creditors. This is a fairly formal business. For example, the list
must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor or his agent.19
The list must also contain the name and address of all creditors of the
transferor with the amounts of their debts when known and the names
of all persons who have disputed claims against the transferor. 96 No time
190 UCC § 6-109(1).
191 This issue will not often be of great significance as a practical matter since the
requirements of the dispatch of the notice are more carefully worked out. See UCC § 6-105.
192 UCC § 6-104(3).
193 A creditor was unsuccessful in an attempt to assert liability for deceit against an
officer of the corporate transferor who misrepresented the existence of creditors in Cliftex
Clothing Co. v. DiSanto, 88 R.I. 338, 148 A.2d 273 (1959).
194 See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 552, § 37, adding § 940-b of the Penal Law. Optional
§ 6-106 of the Code provides for a duty to account for the proceeds of the sale.
195 UCC § 6-104(2).
196 UCC § 6-104(2). In New York this section was modified to permit the inclusion of
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is specified for the preparation of the list. Nonetheless, because section
6-105 requires that the notice to creditors must be dispatched at least
ten days before the transferee takes possession of the goods or pays for
them, the transferor should assure himself that the list is prepared at
least ten days before such transfer of possession or payment.
In addition to the list of creditors the parties must also prepare a
schedule sufficient to identify the property transferred. 19 7 Both the list
of creditors and the schedule of the property must be preserved for
six months following the transfer. 198 Alternatively those papers may be
filed in a public office. 199 The Code is also silent as to the time when the
schedule of property must be prepared. Since the purpose of the Code
rules is to inform other creditors of the fact of the transfer, it is pref-
erable, perhaps mandatory, to prepare the schedule in advance of the
transfer. The Code requirement that the description need only be suf-
ficient to identify the property will permit the inclusion of detailed
provisions for changes in the goods during the interval prior to the
transfer 20° For example, if a stock of merchandise is being held by a
retail store which is open for business, that stock will be constantly
changing. The Code description requirement allows something less than
an exact inventory of the stock. The schedule might anticipate the
changes in terms of the materials or items to be sold in the ordinary
course of business during the gap period.
After the preparation of the list of creditors and the schedule, the
transferor will normally send notices as required by the act. Great care
should be taken to avoid part payment prior to compliance with the
statute. Section 6-105 of the Code specifies that the notice must be sent
ten days before transfer of possession or payment. Two forms of notice
are allowed by the Code.201 The long form seems to be the safest, since
the indenture trustee in lieu of all debenture or bond holders. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch.
553, § 6-104(2) (effective Sept. 27, 1964). Cf. UCC § 6-107(3) (notice to all persons
"known to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the transferor").
197 UCC § 6-104 (1)(b).
198 UCC § 6-104(1)(c).
199 In New York the optional filing may be in the Department of State, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1962, ch. 553, § 6-104(1)(c) (effective September 27, 1964). UCC § 6-101, comment
3, suggests that the availability of such information may help to upset fraudulent con-
veyances.
200 UCC § 6-104(1) (b). Compare UCC § 9-110 providing that a description of collateral
in a security agreement is sufficient "if it reasonably identifies what is described."
201 UCC § 6-107. If the transferor's debts are to be paid in full as they fall due as a
result of the transaction the short form requires only a statement that the bulk transfer is
about to be made, the names and addresses of the transferor and the transferee, all other
business names and addresses of the transferor within the three years preceding the transfer,
and an assertion that the transferor's debts are to be paid in full. The long form requires
in addition (a) the location and general description of the property and the estimated total
of the transferor's debts; (b) the address where the schedule of property and the list of
creditors may be inspected; (c) whether the transfer is to pay existing debts, and, if so,
the amount of the debt and the identity of the creditor; (d) whether the transfer is for
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use of the short form may involve litigation as to whether the transferor
doubted that the debts of the transferee would be paid in full as they
fell due. Comment 2 indicates that the short form is designed to facilitate
honest and solvent transactions. This is a laudable goal, but in some
cases the use of the short form will be the avenue for later claims that
the transactions were neither honest nor solvent.
Registered mail is the method of dispatch called for by the Code2 02
Connecticut, Michigan, and New York have all modified the statute to
permit mailing of the notice by certified mail.2 03 Other states may have
accomplished the same result in their general construction laws.2°0 In any
event the certified mail, developed after the drafting of the Code,
should be a proper means of sending any notice.
(d) Defective Transfers and Limitations of Actions. When a trans-
feror fails to comply with the requirements of the article, the transfer
is made ineffective against creditors of the transferor.20 5 The specific
remedial techniques open to the attacking creditors are left by the Code
to the existing law of the enacting jurisdiction. Nonetheless, comment 2
to section 6-104 indicates an intent on the part of the draftsman to permit
creditors to "disregard the transfer and levy on the goods as still be-
longing to the transferor, or a receiver representing them can take them
by whatever procedure the local law provides."
The Code supplies a statutory period for such assaults on the transfer.
Section 6-111 states a rather short six months' limitation as the basis
for planning the transaction without complying with the formal re-
quirements. For example, payment may be kept in escrow for the six
month period of limitation 0
(e) The Optional Applications of the Proceeds Rule. In five jurisdic-
tions the optional provision of the Code requiring the transferee to
assure that the consideration is applied so far as necessary to pay the
debts of the transferor has been adopted.0 7 The section has some
new consideration and, if so, the amount thereof and the time and place of payment. An
optional section 6-107(2) (e) is for use only where the Code requires the transferee to apply
the proceeds and was not adopted in New York.
202 UCC § 6-107(3).
203 Uniform Commercial Code (Unif. Laws Ann.) § 6-107, Action in Adopting States.
204 See Pacific Discount Co. v. Jackson, 37 N.J. 169, 179 A.2d 745 (1962) (certified
mail authorized in notice of resale under conditional sale contract).
205 UCC §§ 6-104(1), 6-105.
208 The question of the applicable statute of limitations in New York has not been
settled, but it appears that the ten year period in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 53 governs. Hogan
& Penney, "Annotations of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Statutory and Decisional
Law of New York State," N.Y. Annotations to Uniform Commercial Code and Report of
Commission on Uniform Commercial Code 185 (N.Y. Comm'n on Uniform State Laws,
1961).
207 Alaska, Kentucky, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, Uniform .Commercial
Code (Unif. Laws Ann.) § 6-106 Actions in adopting states.
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precedent in prior statutory law and has the advantage of providing a
considerable sanction upon transfers which violate the article.208 It
has, however, the disadvantage of adding an obstacle to a legitimate bulk
transfer. The inclusion of the optional provision will thus depend upon
which of these two commercial values is considered the more im-
portant. 0 9
VII. THE EFFECT OF AND FORMATION OF AGREEMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE 2 SALES
A. Freedom to Modify Code Rules
The reader who has been disturbed by any rule of law described in
the preceding portions of this article is obviously concerned about the
ability of the parties to vary Code rules in their agreement. As a very
general proposition the Code, with a few exceptions, validates agreements
which vary the provisions of any article.
Limitations upon this power come from two sources: The general
treatment of agreements in article 1, and the specific limitations in
particular sections of the Code.
All parties to a Code-covered transaction have a duty of "good faith."
This duty may not be disclaimed by agreement.2 10 For the merchant
under article 2, the duty of good faith will require the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.211 Another limitation
upon agreements varying the Code arises in those areas where the Code
imposes a duty of diligence, reasonableness, and care.2  Even here
the standards by which such duties are to be measured, may be established
by the agreement of the parties so long as these standards are not
manifestly unreasonable. 3 A final indication of the Code's espousal
of freedom of contract is the interpretive rule that where a particular
Code section is silent on the question of variation by agreement, altera-
tions within the limitations previously set forth are effective.214 Some
208 3 Williston, Sales § 643 (rev. ed. 1948); Billig, "Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Eco-
nomic Adjustment," 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 72 (1928). Weintraub & Levin, "Bulk Sales Law and
Adequate Protection of Creditors," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 420 (1952).
209 Starr, Study and Report upon the Uniform Commercial Code by -the Connecticut
Temporary Commission on the Uniform Commercial Code 37 (1959).
210 UCC § 1-102(3). The general duty of good faith is imposed by UCC § 1-203; UCC
§ 1-201(19) defines good faith as honesty in fact. Obviously the courts will be required to
spell out this duty. See Braucher, "The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 813 (1958); Note, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 198 (1961).
211 UCC § 2-103(1)'(b). Note, 39 Geo. L.J. 130 (1950).
212 UCC § 1-102(3). Generally on variation see Bunn, "Freedom of Contract Under the
Uniform Commercial Code," 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 59 (1960).
213 UCC § 1-102(3).
214 UCC § 1-102(4). One more "freedom of agreement" section is UCC § 1-105 per-
mitting agreement as to "choice of law" if there is a "reasonable relation" between the
transaction and the state or nation chosen. See Cullen, "Conflicts of Laws Problems Under
the Commercial Code," 48 Ky. L.J. 333 (1960).
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variations by agreement are explicitly limited or prohibited by the
terms of a section within article 2. These are few in number: (1)
agreement upon the rules of damage recovery must meet the standards of
reasonableness set forth for liquidated damages in section 2-718; (2)
alteration of the remedial structure of article 2 must take into account
the fact that consequential damages may be limited or excluded as long
as the limitation or exclusion is not unconscionable; (3) limitation of
consequential damages or personal injuries in the case of consumer goods
is made prima facie unconscionable; 215 (4) the parties are not completely
free to vary the statute of limitations provided in the Code, since
section 2-725 permits the parties to reduce the period of limitation to
not less than one year and prohibits them from extending the period;
and (5) the privity rule of section 2-316 may not be avoided by a
particular provision in the agreement directed exclusively to altering that
rule. It is noteworthy, however, that all warranty liability may be
disclaimed.
In keeping with the policy decision in article 9 that a person owed a
sum of money should be free to assign that sum as security,21 article 2
provides in section 2-210 that a right to damages for breach of contract or
a right arising out of the assignor's due performance of his entire
obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise. In limiting the
power of the original parties to the transaction to affect the privity rule
or the assignability of underlying claims, the Code is probably grasping
for a general proposition that any rule affecting third parties shall not
be substantially altered by the agreement of the original parties. This
was once an explicit provision in article 1, but it was rejected at the time
of the Law Revision Commission proceedings as an obvious principle.21 7
Consequently, an agreement between a person entrusting goods to a
dealer and the dealer that the protective rule of section 2-403 will not
operate to safeguard any subsequent buyer in ordinary course will most
probably be entirely ineffective.
One overriding limitation upon the power of the parties to provide
the effective rules of law in their agreement is contained in section 2-302
governing unconscionable contracts or contract provisions. This is the
most widely discussed provision in article 2.218 When a court finds as a
215 UCC § 2-719(3). "Prima fade" is not a defined term. See UCC § 1-201(31) for
"presumption" or "presumed."
216 UCC § 9-318.
217 Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed. § 1-102(3) (b) (1952). N.Y.
1956 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 357 recommended deletion of former subsection as "accom-
plishing nothing."
218 Stevens, "A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Remedies and Principles, 41 Cornell
L.Q. 351, 358 (1956); 58 Dick. L. Rev. 161 (1954); 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843 (1960); 18
U. Chi. L. Rev. 146 (1950); Notes, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 (1961); 45 Va. L. Rev. 583
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matter of law that a contract or any clause thereof was unconscionable
at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract;
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the offending clause;
or may so limit the application of the offending clause as to avoid an
unconscionable result. Two important points are made in the comment
to this section. First, it is the draftmen's intent to grant courts the
explicit power to police contracts in order to excise unconscionable
clauses.219 A suggestion is made that in the past such policing has
been accomplished by strained construction of language, by manipulation
of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by determining that a particular
clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract. Secondly, the draftsmen's intent is to prevent oppression by
unfair surprise and not to disturb allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.mo
The principal impact of the section may well be the containment of
the court's willingness to strike down or tinker with the agreement of
the parties. Before the court can proceed under the section the parties
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its commercial settings, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination. Since the questions will be questions of law, a body
of precedents will develop, and the results under the section will become
more predictable. Furthermore, parties will not be surprised by a declara-
tion in a judicial opinion that a court finds that the clause in question
is against public policy. The question must be raised in the initial pro-
ceedings, and evidence must be presented to determine whether or not
the clause in issue is offensive in light of its commercial setting, purpose,
and effect. The most carefully thought out comments on section 2-302
suggests that it should operate only in those situations where the parties
have not really had an opportunity to bargain over a particular
clause.221 Where bargaining has occurred and the overwhelming bargain-
ing power of one of the parties has resulted in the inclusion of the
clause then perhaps the section should not operate to destroy that agree-
ment. Those who fear the application of the section should be reminded
of the fact that the Code has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1954
and in Massachusetts since 1958 and that no reported litigation has arisen
(1959). Comment has ranged from approval of the extension of equitable concepts to rejection
of the section as unworkable. Compare Stevens, supra, with King, "Suggested Changes in
the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales," 33 Ore. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1954)
219 UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
220 Ibid. See also, 1955 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 655.
221 Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 (1961).
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involving the section. 2 Furthermore, there is ample historical precedent
for this kind of policing of agreements in the civil law.2
B. Freedom to Make Effective Contracts
Unlike the Uniform Sales Act the Code provides specific rules for
solving a number of contractual problems in the sales area. As a
general statement it can be said that these rules are formulated to
effectuate the reasonable expectations of the parties to a commercial
transaction.22 The problems are attacked on three bases.
First, there is a substantial alteration in the statute of frauds govern-
ing sales transactions. The memorandum required by the Code statute
of frauds is much less formal than that called for by the prior law. All
material terms of an agreement need not be in writing. The Code
requires only that the memorandum "indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties."O A writing is not insufficient be-
cause it omits or incorrectly states an agreed upon term; but, as a new
limitation, the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown
in the writing 228 Between merchants the requirement of a memorandum
is even further eased. The statute is satisfied if written confirmation is
received and not objected to within ten days; but the confirmation
must be sufficient to bind the sender 227
Various exceptions to the statute of frauds were recognized in prior
law. The Code continues those exceptions with some modifications. For
example, if goods are to be specially manufactured for a buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller substantially commences their manufacture or
arranges for their procurement, the statute is satisfied. 2 s The Code
does not limit the exception to special manufacture by the "seller." Case
law under the prior law was ambiguous on this point.2 The limitation
222 In a pre-Code case the New Jersey court did utilize the section in invalidating a
standard automobile warranty disclaimer of implied warranties. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 46 Cornell L.Q. 607, 615 (1961).
223 Schlesinger, "Uniform Commercial Code in Light of Comparative Law," 1 Inter-Am.
L. Rev. 11, 32 (1959).
224 UCC § 2-207, comment 2.
225 UCC § 2-201(1) (where price $500 or more). In 1960 New York modified the Sales
Act to require that .the memorandum need only "indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties." N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85. Compare Uniform Sales Act § 4.
Both -the New York modification and the Code treat goods separately from choses in
action. UCC § 2-105, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85-a. See UCC §§ 1-206, 8-319, 9-203, 90302.
Note, 70 Yale L.J. 603 (1961).
226 UCC § 2-201(1). Accord, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85.
227 UCC § 2-201(2). Compare Carter, Macy Co. v. Matthews, 220 App. Div. 679, 222
N.Y. Supp. 472 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd 247 N.Y. 532, 161 N.E. 171 (1928). See Harry Rubin
& Sons v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).228 UCC § 2-201,(3)(a).
229 Compare E. G. Lumber Co. v. New York Bondstone Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 985, 179
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upon the exception requiring a substantial beginning of manufacture or
commitments for their procurements is new 30 Another exception dealing
with the payment and receipt of the goods subject to an oral contract
is also preserved in the Code. But the exception only operates to the
extent of the quantity of goods received and accepted.2 31  Finally
the Code gives effect to admissions in court.2 32 And again the exception
only operates to the extent of the quantity admitted in the judicial
proceedings.
In another troubled area of contract formation, the rules governing
offer and acceptance, the Code makes an effective assault. The Code in
the unilateral contract situation makes a nonconforming shipment both
an acceptance and a breach.2 3  The use of this rule, although it seems
logically inconsistent, avoids a serious problem in the prior law. By
using the "unilateral contract trick" a seller could ship nonconforming
goods in response to the buyer's offer for a unilateral contract. When
the buyer received the defective goods and objected that seller was in
breach, the seller could claim that no contract had ever been formed.
234
Under the Code, if the seller communicates to the buyer that the non-
conforming goods are offered only as an accommodation to the buyer,
no contract obligation will be formed.2 35
Another attack upon the formal requirements of the prior law in the
formation of contracts occurs when the "mirror image" rule is abolished.
In section 2-207 the Code provides that an acceptance containing ad-
ditional or different terms is nonetheless effective as an acceptance. 36
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Again the Code states a special rule for merchants. These
additional terms become part of the contract between merchants unless
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; the
additional terms materially alter the offer; or notification of objection
N.Y.S.2d 45 (2d Dep't 1958), with Rosette Pennington, Inc. v. Hayes, 10 Misc. 2d 999,
170 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1957). The 1960 amendment to N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85 is
in accord with -the Code.
230 Compare Uniform Sales Act § 4, with UCC § 2-201(3).
231 UCC § 2-201(3)(b).
232 UCC § 2-201,(3)(c).
233 UCC § 2-206(1)(b).
234 Hawkland, supra note 183, at p. 6; Note, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837, 849 (1957).
235 UCC § 2-206(1)(b).
236 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 84-a was added in 1960 to permit enforcement of a contract
based upon an acceptance which "states additional or different terms which do not
materially vary the terms of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made condi-
tional . . . ." The Code makes the acceptance effective regardless of the materiality of the
variation. See Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 308 (1961). In Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co.,
297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), the court failed to give effect to the operation of UCC
§ 2-207(1) and incorrectly incorporated a test of materiality of the varying provision.
See Notes, 3 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 573 (1962); 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837, 853 (1957).
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to such terms has already been given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received 37 Both the offeror and the acceptor can
thus specifically control the consequences of their actions. The acceptor
can specifically make his acceptance effective only upon assent to the
additional or different terms. The offeror, on the other hand, may even
avoid the special rule for merchants either by expressly limiting his
acceptance or by notifying the acceptor of his objection to the additional
terms. It is noteworthy that only additional terms are made proposals for
addition to the contract 38 As a counseling question the lawyer planning
a sales transaction of a complicated type or drafting the forms for a
series of sales will still be in control of the legal consequences of his
actions. Offers may still be expressly conditioned to limit acceptance to
their terms. Acceptances may also be expressly conditioned and thus
they will then become counteroffers. Finally, the question may be left to
be resolved by the Code.
The third major assault by the Code upon the technical difficulties of
contract law concerns the doctrine of consideration. Under section
2-209 there is no longer a need for consideration in an agreement
modifying an existing sales contract. In substitution for the requirement
of consideration the parties to the original agreement may specify that
modification or rescission must be by a signed writing.239 This permits
the parties to avoid the difficulties inherent in oral proof of contract
modifications, but the Code limits the effect of this rule in situations
involving a merchant and a nonmerchant. If a form is supplied by the
merchant, the particular provision requiring a signed writing for modifica-
tion must be separately signed by the nonmerchant. 2" This requirement
is designed to prevent surprise to a consumer 241
Finally, various provisions in article 2 permit the parties to make
somewhat indefinite agreements and make those agreements enforceable.
For example, in section 2-305 the parties may sell goods at a price to be
agreed upon in the future, and in section 2-306 output and require-
ment contracts are validated. In addition, in section 2-311 details of
performance may be filled in by one of the other parties without running
the risk of having the contract invalidated for indefiniteness.2 42
237 UCC § 2-207(2).
238 Compare subsection (1) and (2) of UCC § 2-207.
239 The inroads upon the consideration doctrine in the Code are ably summarized in
Patterson, "An Apology For Consideration," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 930, 947 (1958). See UCC
§§1-207, 2-205, 2-207, 5-105. Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(2).
240 UCC § 2-209(2). Substantially in accord, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(2).
241 UCC § 2-209, comment 3.
242 See generally, Note, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1956).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
At the beginning we established as our goal the communication of
the basic policy and approach of articles 2 and 6 of the Code as well as
an elaboration of some of the techniques of the Code. A word seems in
order here on the overall effect of article 2 of the Code. I suggest that
experience in the states where the Code has been in effect for substantial
periods of time shows both that articles 2 and 6 are workable. The cases
produced under the Code both in Pennsylvania and in Massachusetts,
have caused little difficulty for the courts and have for the most part been
predictable to anyone reasonably familiar with the Code. Only on rare
occasions when a court strains to get back to the pre-Code rules of law,
does the judicial approach to the Court become unsatisfactory. The bar
has a special obligation to acquaint the bench with the details of the
application of the Code to their particular problems. No less is the obli-
gation of the court to attempt to discern rationally'the policies of the
Code and to apply the statute in an efficacious fashion.
All answers to all problems are contained neither in the Code nor the
pre-Code law. The Code does provide more solutions, more clearly
expressed and more in keeping with present needs.
